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Abstract
This thesis proposes the MAP-REDUCE framework, a programmable frame-
work, that can be used to construct enforcement mechanisms of different
security policies. The framework is based on the idea of secure multi-
execution in which multiple copies of the controlled program are executed.
In order to construct an enforcement mechanism of a policy, users have
to write a MAP program and a REDUCE program to control inputs and
outputs of executions of these copies.
This thesis illustrates the framework by presenting enforcement mecha-
nisms of non-interference (from Devriese and Piessens), non-deducibility
(from Sutherland) and deletion of inputs (a policy proposed by Mantel). It
demonstrates formally soundness and precision of these enforcement mech-
anisms.
This thesis also presents the investigation on sufficient condition of poli-
cies that can be enforced by the framework. The investigation is on reactive
programs that are input total and have to finish processing an input item
before handling another one. For reactive programs that always terminate
on any input, non-empty testable hypersafety policies can be enforced. For
reactive programs that might diverge, non-empty downward closed w.r.t.
termination policies can be enforced.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and objectives
Non-interference [22] prevents leakage of confidential data to attackers by
requiring that the confidential data do not interfere with events observable
to attackers. With or without the confidential data, observations to attack-
ers should be the same. By weakening or strengthening some assumptions
of non-interference, researchers proposed other information flow policies,
such as non-deducibility [45], declassification polcies [42], etc.
Information flow policies can be enforced by different techniques [41,
30, 20, 38, 47]. Among them, the secure multi-execution technique [20, 38,
51, 50, 25, 4, 47] has an advantage that is it does not change behaviour
of programs that already comply with the policy. This technique executes
multiple instances of the controlled program and carefully controls their
input and output behaviors.
There are several enforcement mechanisms based on secure multi-execution
technique [20, 38, 51, 50, 25, 4, 47]. However, they work only for a sin-
gle information flow policy, typically non-interference or non-interference
with declassification. Modification of these mechanisms to enforce another
information flow policy is not straight-forward.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Research Question 1. Is there a general purpose, i.e. pro-
grammable, enforcement framework that is based on the secure
multi-execution technique and can be used to construct enforcement
mechanisms of different policies?
Given a general purpose enforcement framework for information flow
policies based on the secure multi-execution technique. Enforcement mech-
anisms from this framework have to satisfy different properties. Two im-
portant properties are soundness and precision. An enforcement mech-
anism is sound if the application of the enforcement mechanism on any
program complies with the policy. An enforcement mechanism is precise if
it does not change the behaviour of programs that already obey the policy.
Additional interesting issues are the classes of policies that can be en-
forced by enforcement mechanisms from such a framework. Constructed
enforcement mechanisms from the framework can explore alternative exe-
cutions and observe inputs and output of these executions. However, they
cannot know whether an execution terminates or not.
Purely static enforcement mechanisms (i.e. mechanisms that accept or
reject a program after some finite amount of analysis) can enforce decidable
properties of programs [23]. A mechanism of execution monitoring can
only observe executions of the controlled program and terminate them if
it detects a violation. Roughly speaking, execution monitors can enforce
computable safety properties [43, 48]. Edit automata are mechanisms that
are more powerful than execution monitors and can enforce infinite renewal
properties [33]. There is no investigation on classes of policies that can be
enforced by enforcement mechanisms based on the secure multi-execution
technique.
Research Question 2. Which policies can be enforced soundly and
precisely by using a general purpose enforcement framework based
on the secure multi-execution technique?
2
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I0 π[0] O0
Ij π[j] Oj
ITOP π[TOP] OTOP
REDUCEMAP
Input Queue Output Queue
Local Executions
Local Input Queue Local Output Queue
Figure 1.1: Architecture of enforcement mechanisms
1.2 Contribution
This thesis presents the MAP-REDUCE framework, a programmable frame-
work, that can be used to construct enforcement mechanisms of differ-
ent security policies. The enforcement mechanisms rely on secure multi-
execution technique. To construct an enforcement mechanism of an infor-
mation flow policy users have to write a program of MAP to control inputs
consumed by the enforcement mechanisms, and a program of REDUCE to
control outputs generated by the enforcement mechanism. Programs of
MAP and REDUCE are written by using instructions whose semantics is
formally specified.
Figure 1.1 depicts the general architecture of the enforcement mecha-
nism of a policy on a controlled program pi. It is composed by global input
and output queues, MAP and REDUCE components, and an array EX of
local executions (pi[0], . . . , pi[TOP ], where TOP is the index of the last
local execution in the array).
The global input queue contains the input items from the external en-
vironment, and the global output queue contains the output items filtered
by the enforcement mechanism to the environment.
Local executions pi[j] are instances of the original program pi. They
are unaware of each other, and are separated from the environment input
3
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
and output actions by the enforcement mechanism. The local input (resp.
output) queue of a local execution contains the input (resp. output) items
that can be freely consumed (resp. generated) by this local execution.
When a local execution needs an input item that is not yet ready in its
local input queue it will request the help of MAP by emitting an interrupt
signal. When a local execution generates an output item it emits a signal
to request the help of REDUCE.
MAP is responsible for performing input operations and sending input
items to local executions. It can also make clones of local executions or
wake local executions up. REDUCE can collect output items generated
by local execution and send output items to global output queue. It can
remove local executions from the array of local executions or wake local
executions up.
This thesis illustrates the framework by presenting enforcement mech-
anisms for three information flow policies: non-interference [20], deletion
of inputs [34]), and non-deducibility [45]. Soundness and precision of con-
structed enforcement mechanisms are formally demonstrated.
This thesis presents the investigation on which policies can be enforced
soundly and precisely by using this framework. Controlled programs are
reactive programs that are input total and have to finish processing an
input item before handling another one. The investigation focuses on en-
forcement mechanisms whose MAP consumes inputs, sends different inputs
to different copies of the controlled program, and REDUCE collects outputs
from all local executions and decides good outputs to outside. For reac-
tive programs that always terminates on inputs, any non-empty testable
hypersafety policy [37] can be enforced. The thesis introduces downward
closed w.r.t. termination policies and shows that for reactive programs
that might diverge on inputs, any non-empty downward closed w.r.t. ter-
mination policies can be enforced.
4
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Table 1.1: Enforcement mechanisms of policies
Policy
Components
MAP REDUCE
Termination (in)sensitive non-interference [20] Figure 4.2a Figure 4.2b
Deletion of inputs [34] Figure 4.5a Figure 4.5b
Termination (in)sensitive non-deducibility [45] Figure 4.8a Figure 4.8b
Non-empty testable hypersafety policies [37] Figure 5.4 Figure 5.5
Non-empty downward closed w.r.t. termination
policies
Figure 6.2 Figure 6.3
A summary of MAP and REDUCE programs for enforcing non-interference,
deletion of inputs, non-deducibility, testable hypersafety policies, and down-
ward closed w.r.t. termination policies can be found in Table 1.1.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of exist-
ing enforcement mechanisms constructed with the secure multi-execution
technique, and enforceable policies. Chapter 3 describes semantics of con-
trolled programs and the framework. Chapter 4 illustrates the framework
by presenting enforcement mechanisms of non-interference [20], deletion of
inputs [34] and non-deducibility [45]. Chapter 5 shows the investigation
on which policies can be enforced by the framework on reactive programs
that are input total, have to finish processing an input item before han-
dling another one, and process inputs in finite time. Chapter 6 presents
downward closed w.r.t. termination policies defined on reactive programs
that might diverge on inputs. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
5

Chapter 2
State of the Art
This chapter presents existing enforcement mechanisms of infor-
mation flow policies. The focus of the presentation is on enforce-
ment mechanisms constructed with secure multi-execution tech-
nique. Next, it presents policies that can be statically or dynam-
ically enforced.
2.1 Enforcement mechanisms of information flow poli-
cies
Many of static analyses are based on type systems. An example of a type
system for non-interference can be found in [49] where intuitively, variables
at confidential level in a well-typed program do not interfere with variables
at public level. A discussion of static analysis on enforcing information
flow policies can be found in the survey of Sabelfeld and Myers [41] and in
Le Guernic’s PhD thesis [30]. Static analysis may reject secure programs
[41].
For dynamic analysis, an extensive survey up until 2007 is in Le Guer-
nic’s PhD thesis [30]. Taint tracking only tracks explicit flows and thus is
unsound. A generic framework that captures the essense of explicit flows
7
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can be found in [44]. Austin and Flanagan [2] proposed an enforcement
mechanism in which assignments to public variables in confidential con-
texts are forbidden. In their subsequent work [3], they developed another
technique that may be more permissive. When an assignment to a public
variable in a confidential context occurs, it is allowed. If later in the execu-
tion, there is a branch on this variable, or the value of this variable is to be
output, the execution is stopped. Recent works focus on JavaScript. Russo
et al. [40] proposed a monitor that track information flow in dynamic tree
structures. Russo and Sabelfeld [39] proposed a monitor that prevents
insecure information flow via assignments to public variables. They also
address internal timing attacks, a type of attacks where attackers do not
need access to a clock. Similar to static analysis techniques, dynamic anal-
ysis techniques may rejects some secure programs.
Hybrid monitors [31, 29, 8] are based on the combination of dynamic
analysis and static analysis and can accept more secure programs. In the
monitor proposed by Le Guernic et al. [31], when a branch instruction
is executed, variables that can be influenced by confidential data in the
unexecuted branch are syntactically analyzed. This information is used
to prevent implicit indirect flows. In [29], Le Guernic presented a more
permissive static analysis and gave constraints that characterize a set of
static analysis techniques that can be used. In [8], Besson et al. proposed a
generic framework that is parametrised by static analysis techniques. They
compared existing hybrid monitors by relative precision and showed that
their instantiated monitor is more precise. Hybrid monitors may still reject
some secure programs.
The secure multi-execution technique can be used to enforce precisely
information flow policies [20, 38, 51]. To the best of our knowledge, the
first secure multi-execution based enforcement mechanisms are in [26, 15].
Devriese and Piessens independently formalized the idea in [20] and pro-
8
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High Execution
Low Execution
Confidential output channelsConfidential input channels
Public input channels Public output channels
Fake confidential input items
Only the high execution (resp. the low execution) can consume input items from confidential input
channels (resp. public input channels). The high execution has to reuse input items from public channels
consumed by the low execution. When the low execution needs a high input item, it will be fetched a
fake input item. Only the high execution (resp. the low execution) can send its outputs to confidential
output channels (resp. public output channel).
Figure 2.1: Secure Multi-Execution
posed an enforcement mechanism called secure multi-execution (SME). We
next describe SME proposed by Devriese and Piessens since their work has
attracted many researchers to the technique.
The basic idea of SME with two security levels is depicted in Figure 2.1.
The enforcement mechanism contains two local executions which are copies
of the controlled program. The low execution can ask and receive public
input items from input channels. Whenever the low execution needs a
high input item, it is fetched with a fake value. When the low execution
terminates, the high execution starts executing. The high execution can
ask and receive confidential input items from input channels, and it has
to reuse public input items asked by the low execution. The high (resp.
low) execution can send output items to confidential (resp. public) output
channels. Output items of the high execution (resp. the low execution) to
public (resp. confidential) output channels are ignored.
SME-based enforcement mechanisms. Khatiwala et al. [26] proposed a
technique called data sandboxing. The controlled program is split into
two partitions: public zone and private zone. The private zone contains
instructions used to process confidential data. The public zone contains
9
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the remained ones. This technique is applicable only when the source of
the controlled program is available. Capizzi et al. [15] proposed the shadow
execution technique. The privileges of copies of the controlled program on
inputs and outputs are as in SME.
In SME, the scheduler for local executions is fixed, that is the low ex-
ecution has to be executed first. Kashyap et al. [25] explored different
scheduler strategies (for example, all local executions are executed in par-
allel, or local executions are executed in an interleave manner, etc) and
their security guarantees on termination and timing covert channels [35].
In SME, for non-interferent programs, the order of the output events are
not preserved. This limitation was addressed by Rafnsson and Sabelfeld
[38], and Zanarini et al. [51]. In the work of Rafnsson and Sabefeld, instead
of being ignored, the public outputs of the high execution are matched with
the public outputs of the low execution. If there is a deviation, the con-
trolled program is not non-interferent. To preserve the order of events,
Zanarini et al. [51] let the controlled program and the application of SME
on the controlled program are executed in parallel and their outputs are
checked at each steps. If there is a mismatch, there is a presence of infor-
mation leakage.
In SME, the set of input and output channels are fixed and each channel
is assigned to a fixed security level (for example, high or low). By extending
the enforcement mechanism in [51], Zanarini and Jaskelioff proposed the
enforcement mechanism that can be used in the situation where the set
of channels can be changed and the security level of a channel can be
reassigned [50].
Declassification policies [42] are addressed in [38, 47, 4]. In the work of
Rafnsson and Sabelfeld [38], for policies in which the occurrence of confi-
dential input events can be declassified [42], when there is a confidential
input value sent to the high execution, a fake high input value is sent to
10
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the low execution. Thus, the low execution knows the occurrence of confi-
dential events but not their values. For policies which specify what can be
declassified, values computed by expressions marked with declassification
annotations in the high execution are available for being used by the low
execution. In the work of Vanhoef et al., declassify annotations are only
directives indicating that a particular value is computed by the release
function [47]. In their work, the stateless project function that projects
confidential events to events visible to attackers is idempotent. Bolosteanu
and Garg [14] proposed an enforcement mechanism called asymmetric SME
in which the low execution is a variant of the original program. Asymmet-
ric SME can enforce declassification policies where the projection functions
are not idempotent, and can enforce policies whose states depend on pro-
gram outputs. Austin and Flanagan [4] proposed enforcement mechanisms
for robust declassification [52], which requires that active attackers (who
can introduce new code) are no more powerful than passive attackers (who
can only observe).
Austin and Flanagan [4] proposed the multiple facet technique that can
simulates SME by using faceted values. A faceted value is a triple consist-
ing of a principal, a value that appears to observers who can view private
data of the principal, and a value that appears to observers who cannot
view private data of the principal. SME with two security levels (confiden-
tial and public) can be simulated by the multiple facet technique with a
single principal. The author reported that when the number of principals
increases, the multiple facet technique is the more efficient approach.
Barthe et al. [5] proposed a way to achieve the security guarantees
of SME by program transformation. Given a controlled program, a new
program is created by sequentially composing copies of the original pro-
grams. They also proposed a variant of the transformation for concurrent
programming languages. One advantage of program transformation is that
11
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it does not require modifications to runtime environment.
Implementations of SME are reported in [26, 15, 20, 24, 9, 18, 4, 19,
47]. Khatiwala et al. [26] reported the implementation of a prototype.
Capizzi et al. [15] implemented their proposed techniques on Firefox,
Adobe Reader, etc. Devriese and Piessens [20] implemented a prototype
using a Javascript engine. Jaskelioff and Russo [24] proposed a monadic
library to implement SME in Haskell. Austin and Flanagan [3] evaluated
their idea of faceted values by an implementation on Firefox. They reported
that when the number of principals increases, their approach becomes more
efficient. Bielova et al. [9] reported an implementation of SME with Feath-
erfox [13], a model of browsers implemented in Ocaml. In implementations
of both Bielova et al. [9] and Capizzi et al. [15], two local copies of the
browser are executed. De Groef et al. [18, 19] implemented SME with
FireFox and presented the first fully functional web browser. Instead of
having two instances of the browser executed as in [9, 15], two instances
of scripts are executed. They reported that the performance and memory
cost is substantial but not prohibitive. The implementation reported in
[47] is based on the implementation on [18, 19].
A summary of the SME-based enforcement mechanisms is presented in
Table 2.1. The last five columns of the table correspond to five features of
enforcement mechanisms: (1) Scheduler: enforcement mechanisms inves-
tigate the influence of the order of executing local executions on security
guarantees; (2) Event Order: enforcement mechanisms preserves order of
output events; (3) Dynamic Channel: enforcement mechanisms can cope
with the situation where the set of channels is not fixed and security levels
of channels can be changed dynamically; (4) Declassification: enforcement
mechanisms can enforce declassification policies; and (5) Implementation:
enforcement mechanisms are implemented. When we mark an enforcement
mechanism with the X mark, we mean that this enforcement mechanism
12
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has a particular feature. The work in [18] is extended in [19] and hence it
is not presented in the table.
2.2 Enforceable security policies
Hamlen et al. [23] investigated the class of statically enforceable policies.
Generally, a policy is statically enforceable if there is a machine that takes
an arbitrary program as an input and returns true in finite time if the pro-
gram satisfies the policy, otherwise, it returns false in finite time. Hamlen
et al. proved that the class of statically enforceable security policies is the
class of decidable properties of programs. They also proposed a class of
policies that can be enforced by program rewriters. A program rewriter
modifies, in finite time, untrusted programs before their executions. How-
ever, they did not give a precise characterization of this class.
Schneider [43] demonstrated that for a policy to be enforced by execu-
tion monitors, it has to be a safety property [27]. Schneider also introduced
monitors called security automata that can be used as recognizers for safety
properties. These automata can observe executions of programs, and ter-
minating the executions if violations are detected.
The condition for a policy to be enforced was further refined by Viswanathan
[48]. Viswanathan observed that a finite execution must be checked whether
it is good or bad in finite time. If this condition is violated, then an enforce-
ment mechanism cannot know whether the finite execution it has observed
so far is good or not and thus cannot do an appropriate action.
Hamlen et al. pointed out that not all policies that satisfy conditions
proposed by Schneider and Viswanathan can be enforced [23]. For exam-
ple, it is impossible for enforcement mechanisms to enforce a policy if it
forbids all interventions available to enforcement mechanisms. Basin et al.
revised enforceable safety policies [7, 6]. They differentiated actions that
13
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2.2. ENFORCEABLE SECURITY POLICIES
are only observable by enforcement mechanisms (that is the enforcement
mechanism can see them but not prevent) and actions that are controllable
by enforcement mechanisms. They gave necessary and sufficient conditions
for a security policy to be enforceable based on their generalized notion of
safety properties.
Ligatti et al. investigated which policies can be enforced by edit au-
tomata [32, 33]. In addition to terminating executions as security au-
tomata, edit automata can insert events or remove events. Ligatti et al.
proved that edit automata can enforce a class of policies called infinite re-
newal properties which include some liveness properties [1]. They argued
that the set of computable safety properties is included in the set of infinite
renewal properties.
Given an edit automaton, Bielova and Massacci investigated the ques-
tion whether the automaton really enforced the security policy that you
wanted [10, 11]. They introduced a fine grained classification of edit au-
tomata and related security properties. They also investigated the influ-
ence of enforcement mechanisms on bad executions (or how far bad ex-
ecutions are changed by enforcement mechanisms) [12]. They proposed
iterative properties and enforcement mechanisms that can handle bad ex-
ecutions in a more predictable way.
Fong [21] investigated policies that can be enforced by execution moni-
tors that are limited by the information that they can track. He introduced
shallow history automata that track only a shallow access history and use
this information to make decision on granting access. Despite the limita-
tion, many policies are still enforceable. Talhi et al. [46] extended works
of Schneider [43], Ligatti [32, 33], and Fong [21], and introduced a class of
automata called bounded history automata. They gave a classification of
policies that are enforceable under memory limitation constraints.
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2.3 Summary
This chapter presented several enforcement mechanisms of information flow
policies which are constructed based on the secure multi-execution tech-
nique. One problem with those enforcement mechanisms is that they en-
force only single information flow policy, usually non-interference or non-
interference with declassification. This chapter also presented the investi-
gation on enforceable policies. The existing investigation does not cover
runtime enforcement mechanisms that can explore different executions.
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Chapter 3
MAP-REDUCE Framework
This chapter presents the small step operational semantics of con-
trolled programs, local executions, MAP programs, and REDUCE
programs.
3.1 Overview
Instructions used to compose controlled programs, MAP, and REDUCE
programs are presented in respectively Figure 3.1a, Figure 3.1b, and Fig-
ure 3.1c. Basic instructions which are assignment, condition, loop, skip,
input and output instructions might be used to compose controlled pro-
grams, MAP programs, and REDUCE programs.
MAP is responsible for sending inputs to local executions, creating local
executions, or changing states of local executions. Thus, in addition to
basic instructions, instructions in programs of MAP might be map, wake,
and clone instructions. MAP can send input values to local executions by
map instructions, wake local executions up by wake instructions, and make
clones of local executions by clone instructions.
REDUCE needs to collect outputs from local executions, remove local
executions, or modify states of local executions. Therefore, for REDUCE,
additional instructions are retrieve, wake, and kill instructions. Retrieve
17
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pi ::=x := e assignment
|if e then pi else pi if
|while e do pi while
|skip skip
|input x from c input
|output e to c output
|pi; pi sequence
(a) Controlled program instructions
piM ::=pi program instructions
|map(e, c, PRED[ ]) map
|wake(PRED[ ]) wake
|clone(PRED[ ]) clone
(b) MAP instructions
piR ::=pi program instructions
|retrieve x from (j, c) retrieve
|wake(PRED[ ]) wake
|clean(c, PRED[ ]) clean
|kill(PRED[ ]) kill
(c) REDUCE instructions
pi, e, x, c, piM , piR, and PRED are meta-variables for respectively instructions, expressions, variables,
(input/output) channels, instructions of MAP, instructions of REDUCE, and predicates. A (controlled,
MAP, or REDUCE) program is a sequence of instructions. Executions of instructions with PRED as a
parameter influence local executions that satisfies PRED.
Figure 3.1: Language instructions
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instructions allow REDUCE to collect output items generated by local ex-
ecutions. Kill instructions allow REDUCE to remove local executions from
the array of local executions. REDUCE can clean local output queues of
local executions by clean instructions.
3.2 Semantics of controlled programs
Our model programming language is derived from [20]. We consider only
deterministic programs. A program pi is an instruction composed from the
basic instructions described in Figure 3.1a. Since a program is a sequence
of instructions (i.e. a complex instruction itself), we will use program
and instruction interchangeably. An example of controlled programs is
presented in Example 3.2.1.
Example 3.2.1. Figure 3.2a present a JavaScript script that facilitates the
job application process. The execution of this program gets the selected posi-
tion of an applicant from a low channel (Figure 3.2a, line 1) and his desired
salary from a high channel (Figure 3.2a, line 2). Then, if the selected posi-
tion is CEO and the desired salary is not too high, the execution will get the
bonus from a confidential channel which is https://aCompany/getBonus.
After that, the program displays the desired salary and the bonus to user
(Figure 3.2a-line 15), and send these data to http://attacker (Fig-
ure 3.2a-lines 17-19), a low channel that attackers can directly observe.
The program is rewritten in our model language and the rewritten ver-
sion is described in Figure 3.2b. The public input channel for getting the
selected position is cL1, the confidential input channels for getting the de-
sired salary and the bonus are respectively cH1 and cH2. Confidential chan-
nel cH3 is corresponding to the one used to show desired salary and bonus
to user. Public channel cL2 is corresponding to http://attacker.
Let I (resp. O) be an enumerable set of input values (resp. output
19
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1 var selectedPosition = document.getElementbyId(’selectedPosition’).value;
2 var desiredSalary = document.getElementbyId(’desiredSalary’).value;
3
4 var bonus = 0;
5 var xmlHttpsBonus = new XMLHttpRequest();
6 xmlHttpsBonus.open("POST","https://aCompany/getBonus",false);
7
8 var isSalaryHighNotTooHigh = checkSalary(desiredSalary)
9 if (selectedPosition == ’CEO’) and isSalaryHighNotTooHigh {
10 xmlHttpsBonus.send();
11 var xmlDocs=xmlHttpsBonus.responseXML;
12 bonus = xmlDocs.getElementsByTagName("bonus")[0].
13 childNodes[0].nodeValue; }
14
15 document.getElementbyId(’info’).value = desiredSalary + bonus;
16
17 var xmlhttpAttacker = new XMLHttpRequest();
18 xmlhttpAttacker.open("POST","http://attacker/");
19 xmlhttpAttacker.send(desiredSalary + bonus);
(a) In JavaScript
1 input l1 from cL1
2 input h1 from cH1
3 h2 := 0
4 b := check(h1)
5 if l1 and b then
6 input h2 from cH2
7 output h1 + h2 to cH3
8 output h1 + h2 to cL2
//corresponding to line 1
//corresponding to line 2
//corresponding to line 4
//corresponding to line 8
//corresponding to line 9
//corresponding to lines 10-13
//corresponding to line 15
//corresponding to lines 17-19
(b) In our language
Figure 3.2: Running example program - Job application
values). We model an input (output) item as a vector and define input
(output) of programs as queues. We use vectors of channel to accommo-
date forms in which multiple fields are submitted simultaneously but are
classified differently (e.g. credit card numbers vs. user names).
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Definition 3.2.1. An input vector ~v is a mapping from input channels to
their values, ~v : Cin → I ∪ {⊥}, where the value ⊥ is the special undefined
value. An output vector ~v is a mapping from output channels to their
values, ~v : Cout → O ∪ {⊥}.
Given a vector ~v and a channel c, the value of the channel is denoted by
~v[c]. The symbol ~⊥ denotes an output vector mapping all channels to ⊥.
To simplify the formal presentation, in the sequel w.l.o.g. we assume that
each input and output operation only affect one channel at a time. Thus,
for each vector, there is only one channel c such that ~v[c] 6= ⊥.
Let (finite) queue Q be a sequence of elements q1.q2 . . . qn. The addition
of new element q to Q is denoted by Q.q and the result of the addition
is queue q1.q2 . . . qn.q. After removing the first element from Q, we get
q2 . . . qn. By  we denote an empty queue.
To define an execution configuration, we use a set of labelled pairs.
A labelled pair is composed by a label and an object and in the form
label:object. The label is attached to the object in order to differentiate
this object from others, so each label occurs only once. For example,
map:prgpiM is the instruction to be executed of MAP. A summary of labels
and their semantics used in this report is in Table 3.1.
Definition 3.2.2. An execution configuration of a program is a set {prg:
pi,mem:m, in:I, out:O}, where pi is the program to be executed, m is the
memory that is a function mapping variables to values, I is the input (a
queue of input vectors) to be consumed, and O is the generated output (a
queue of output vectors).
The operational semantics of controlled programs is described in Fig-
ure 3.3. The conclusion part of each semantic rule is written as ∆,Γ ⇒
∆,Γ′, where ∆ denotes the elements of the execution configuration that
are unchanged upon the transition. The semantics of the comma “,” in the
21
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ASSG
pi = x := e m(e) = val
∆, prg:pi,mem:m_ ∆, prg:skip,mem:m[x 7→ val]
COMP
prg:pi1,mem:m, in:I, out:O _ prg:pi′1,mem:m′, in:I ′, out:O′
prg:pi1; pi2,mem:m, in:I, out:O _ prg:pi′1; pi2,mem:m′, in:I ′, out:O′
IF-T
pi = if e then pi1 else pi2 m(e) = T
∆, prg:pi _ ∆, prg:pi1
IF-F
pi = if e then pi1 else pi2 m(e) = F
∆, prg:pi _ ∆, prg:pi2
WHIL-T
pi = while e do piloop m(e) = T
∆, prg:pi _ ∆, prg:piloop; pi
WHIL-F
pi = while e do piloop m(e) = F
∆, prg:pi _ ∆, prg:skip
SKIP
∆, prg:skip; pi _ ∆, prg:pi
INP
pi = input x from c I = ~v.I ′ ~v[c] 6= ⊥
∆, prg:pi,mem:m, in:I _ ∆, prg:skip,mem:m[x 7→ ~v[c]], in:I ′
OUTP
pi = output e to c ~v = ~⊥[c 7→ m(e)]
∆, prg:pi, out:O _ ∆, prg:skip, out:O.~v
Figure 3.3: Semantics of instructions of controlled programs
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Table 3.1: Labels and their semantics
Label Semantics
prg Controlled program or program executed by a component (a local execu-
tion, MAP, or REDUCE)
mem Memory of the controlled program or of a component (a local execution,
MAP, or REDUCE)
in Input of the controlled program, the enforcement mechanism, or a local
execution
out Output of the controlled program, the enforcement mechanism, or a local
execution
top Index of the last execution in the array EX
stt State of a local execution (Sleeping or Executing)
int Interrupt signal sent by a local execution
map Configuration of the MAP component
red Configuration of the REDUCE component
expression ∆,Γ is the disjoint union of ∆ and Γ. We abuse the notation
of the memory function m(.) and use it to evaluate expressions to values.
When an output command sends a value to the channel c, an output vector
~v = ~⊥[c 7→ val] is inserted into the output queue, where ~v is the vector
with all undefined channels, except c that is mapped to m(e), so ~v[c′] = ⊥
for all c′ 6= c and ~v[c] = m(e).
The initial configuration of controlled program pi with input I is {prg:
pi,mem:m0, in:I, out:}, where m0 is the function mapping variable to ini-
tial values. An execution of program pi on input I is a finite sequence of
configuration transitions γ0 _ γ1 _ . . . _ γk, where γ0 is the initial con-
figuration of pi with input I, and γk is the configuration after k transitions.
The transition sequence can be also written as γ0 _k γk, or γ0 _∗ γk if
the exact number of transitions does not matter.
Definition 3.2.3. An execution of program pi on input I terminates if
there exists a configuration γf = {prg:skip,mem:m, in:, out:O} such that
23
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Input:
PPPPPPPPPPPChannel
Time
0 1
cH1 ⊥ M1
cH2 ⊥ ⊥
cL1 T ⊥
Output:
PPPPPPPPPPPChannel
Time
0 1 2 3
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0
Each column in the tables corresponds to an input/output operation. The execution consumes T and
M1 from channel cL1 and channel cH1 at respectively time 0 and time 1. At time 2 and 3, it generates
output values M1 on channel cH3 and M1 on channel cL2.
Figure 3.4: Execution of the example program
γ0 _∗ γf , where γ0 is the initial configuration of pi with input I. We denote
this whole derivation sequence by (pi, I) ⇓ O using the big step notation.
Example 3.2.2. Let T (resp. F) denote the boolean value true (resp.
false). We consider the execution of the program presented in Figure 3.2
with input (cL1 = T)(cH1 = M1), which means that the input contains two
vectors, the first one contains T from cL1, and the last one contains M1
from cH1. We assume that check(M1) = F.
The execution of the program with the input terminates and generates
output (cH3 = M1 + 0)(cL2 = M1 + 0). The value sent to cH3 and cL2 is
M1 + 0.
We describe input and output queues in Figure 3.4, where each column
in the tables corresponds to an input/output operation. Input and output
tables should be read from left to right; columns describe the input/output
to each channel at time t = 0, t = 1, etc.
The execution consumes T and M1 from channel cL1 and channel cH1
at respectively time 0 and time 1. At time 2 and 3, it generates respectively
output value M1 on channel cH3 and M1 on channel cL2.
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3.3 Semantics of enforcement mechanisms
Definition 3.3.1. A configuration of an enforcement mechanism of a pol-
icy is a set {top :TOP,map.prg :piM ,map.mem :mM , red.prg :piR, red.mem :
mR, in:I, out:O,
⋃
j LECSj}, where TOP is the index of the last execution
in the array of local executions EX, piM (resp. piR) is the instruction to be
executed of MAP (resp. REDUCE), mM (resp. mR) is the memory of MAP
(resp. REDUCE), I is the input that can be consumed, O is the generated
output, and LECSj is the configuration of the j-th local execution.
We denote the enforcement mechanism of policy P on program pi by
EMP(pi). In the initial configuration of the enforcement mechanism with
input I, the input that can be consumed is I, the output generated is
empty, variables in programs of MAP and REDUCE are mapped to initial
values, skip is the only instruction to be executed of MAP and REDUCE. In
addition, all local inputs and local outputs of local executions are empty,
there is no interrupt signal generated by local executions, all variables of all
local executions are mapped to initial values, instructions to be executed
of all local executions and the controlled program are the same.
Definition 3.3.2. The execution of the enforcement mechanism on input
I terminates if there exists a configuration γf such that γ0 ⇒∗ γf , where γ0
is the initial configuration of the enforcement mechanism with input I; and
in γf the input that can be consumed is empty, skip is the only instruction
to be executed of all local executions, MAP and REDUCE. We denote this
whole derivation sequence by (EMP(pi), I) ⇓ O using the big step notation.
We now specify the semantics of the enforcement mechanism compo-
nents: local executions, the programs of MAP and REDUCE. The general
approach is that execution of parallel programs is modeled by the inter-
leaving of concurrent atomic instructions [28] so each transition rule either
25
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by a local execution, by MAP, or by REDUCE is a step of the enforcement
mechanism as a whole.
3.3.1 Local executions
Each local execution is associated with a unique identifier j, that is its index
on the array EX. A local execution can be in one of the two states: E
(Executing) or S (Sleeping). Initially, states of all local executions depend
on policies to be enforced (e.g. in the enforcement mechanisms of sample
policies in Chapter 4, initial states of all local executions are executing
states). A local execution moves from E to S when it has sent an interrupt
signal to require an input item that is not ready in its local input, or to
signal that it has generated an output item. A local execution moves from
S to E when it is awaken by the MAP component (e.g. the input item it
required is ready) or by the REDUCE component (e.g. its output item is
consumed).
Definition 3.3.3. An execution configuration of local execution EX[j] is
a set LECSj , {EX[j].stt : st, EX[j].int : sig, EX[j].prg : pi,EX[j].mem :
m,EX[j].in:I, EX[j].out:O}, where st is the state of the local execution,
sig is the interrupt signal sent by the local execution, pi is an instruction
to be executed, m is the memory, and I and O are local input and local
output respectively.
We define dequeue operator dequeue(Q, c) on queue Q and channel c
that returns (val,Q′), where the value of val is ~v[c], and ~v is the first
vector in Q such that ~v[c] 6= ⊥, and Q′ is obtained by removing ~v from
Q; otherwise (there is no vector ~v in Q such that ~v[c] 6= ⊥), val = ⊥ and
Q′ = Q.
The semantics of local executions for assignment, composition, if, while,
skip instructions is essentially identical to the one of the controlled pro-
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LINP1
EX[j].prg:pi = input x from c
EX[j].stt = E
EX[j].in = I dequeue(I, c) = (val, I ′) val 6= ⊥
∆, EX[j].prg:pi,EX[j].mem:m,EX[j].in:I
⇒ ∆, EX[j].prg:skip, EX[j].mem:m[x 7→ val], EX[j].in:I ′
LINP2
EX[j].prg:pi = input x from c
EX[j].stt = E
EX[j].in = I dequeue(I, c) = (⊥, I ′)
∆, EX[j].stt:E, EX[j].int:⊥ ⇒ ∆, EX[j].stt:S, EX[j].int:(c)
LOUTP
EX[j].prg:pi = output e to c
EX[j].stt = E EX[j].mem = m ~v = ~⊥[c 7→ m(e)]
∆, EX[j].stt:E, EX[j].int:⊥, EX[j].prg:pi,EX[j].out:O
⇒ ∆, EX[j].stt:S, EX[j].int:(c), EX[j].prg:skip, EX[j].out:O.~v
Figure 3.5: Semantics of input and output instructions of pi[j]
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grams. The only difference is the explicit condition that the local state
must be E. We do not present these rules in the paper. We provide the
rules for input and output instructions in Figure 3.5. When the input
instruction is executed and the input item required is in the local input
queue, this item will be consumed (rule LINP1). Otherwise, the local ex-
ecution emits an input interrupt signal (c) and moves to the sleep state
(rule LINP2). The output interrupt signal (c) is generated when the
output instruction is executed (rule LOUTP).
Example 3.3.1. We consider the execution of a local execution of the
program presented in Figure 3.2. Its local input is (cH1 = M1)(cL1 = T),
which means that the input contains two vectors, the first one contains
M1 from cH1, and the last one contains T from cL1. We assume that
check(M1) = F.
The local execution terminates and generates output (cH3 = M1+0)(cL2 =
M1 + 0). The value sent to cH3 and cL2 is M1 + 0. We describe input and
output corresponding to the execution in Figure 3.6, where each column in
the tables corresponds to an input/output operation.
The execution consumes T and M1 from channel cL1 and channel cH1
at respectively time 0 and time 1. At time 2 and 3, it generates respectively
output value M1 on channel cH3 and M1 on channel cL2. Notice that the
first input item in the input does not contain an input value from channel
cL1 and the local execution has to find the first input item that contains
such an input value.
3.3.2 MAP
MAP controls the input actually consumed by the enforcement mechanism.
MAP can perform input operations, broadcast input items to local input
queues of local executions, clone local executions and wake local executions
28
3.3. SEMANTICS OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
Input:
PPPPPPPPPPPChannel
Time
0 1
cH1 M1 ⊥
cH2 ⊥ ⊥
cL1 ⊥ T
Output:
PPPPPPPPPPPChannel
Time
0 1 2 3
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0
Each column in the tables corresponds to an input/output operation. The execution consumes T and
M1 from channel cL1 and channel cH1 at respectively time 0 and time 1. At time 2 and 3, it generates
output values M1 on channel cH3 and M1 on channel cL2.
Figure 3.6: Execution of a local execution
up.
In addition to the instructions in Figure 3.1a (except the output in-
struction that is replaced by the map instruction), the program piM is
also composed by instructions map(e, c, PRED[ ]), clone(PRED[ ]), and
wake(PRED[ ]) described in Figure 3.1b, where e is a meta-variable for
expressions, and PRED[ ] , λx.Pred(x) is a meta-variable for predicates.
The evaluation of the predicate PRED[ ] on the configuration of the local
execution pi[i] is denoted as PRED[i].
The execution of map, wake, or clone instruction is applied simultane-
ously to all local executions pi[j] such that PRED[j] is true as follows. For
map instruction, the value of the expression e is sent to the input queues of
all local executions. The value sent is considered as a value from the chan-
nel c. For wake instruction, all local executions pi[j] are awaken and the
interrupt signals generated by those local executions (if there were some)
are removed. The execution of the clone instruction clones the configu-
ration of each local execution pi[j]. Configurations of new executions are
appended to the array of local executions, and the index of the last local
execution (TOP ) is updated.
The semantics of instructions of assignment, sequence, if, while, and skip
of MAP is similar to the semantics presented in Figure 3.3. The output
29
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INPM
map.prg:piM = input x from c
I = ~v.I ′ ~v[c] 6= ⊥
∆,map.prg:piM ,map.mem:mM , in:I ⇒ ∆,map.prg:skip,map.mem:mM [x 7→ ~v[c]], in:I ′
MAP
map.prg:piM = map(e, c, PRED[ ])
S = {j ∈ {0, . . . , TOP} : PRED[j]} ~v = ~⊥[c 7→ mM(e)]
LECS =
⋃
j∈S
{EX[j].in:I} LECS′ =
⋃
j∈S
{EX[j].in:I.~v}
∆,map.prg:piM , LECS⇒ ∆,map.prg:skip, LECS′
WAKM
map.prg:piM = wake(PRED[ ])
S = {j ∈ {0, . . . , TOP} : PRED[j]}
LECS =
⋃
j∈S
{EX[j].int:sig, EX[j].stt:S} LECS′ =
⋃
j∈S
{EX[j].int:⊥, EX[j].stt:E}
∆,map.prg:piM , LECS⇒ ∆,map.prg:skip, LECS′
CLON
map.prg:piM = clone(PRED[ ])
S = {j ∈ {0, . . . , TOP} : PRED[j]}
LECS =
⋃
0≤j≤TOP
LECSj
LECS′ = LECS ∪
⋃
j∈S
fork(LECSj, TOP + assignInd(j))
∆, top:TOP,map.prg:piM , LECS⇒ ∆, top:TOP + |S|,map.prg:skip, LECS′
Figure 3.7: Semantics of instructions of MAP
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instruction is not used in piM . The semantics of input, map, wake, and clone
instructions is described in Figure 3.7. The execution of map instruction
or wake instruction changes only the program of MAP (referred in the
configuration of the enforcement mechanism by map.prg), and configuration
of local executions that satisfy PRED[ ]. In addition to these changes, the
execution of the clone instruction also changes the index TOP . For map,
wake, and clone instructions, if there is no j such that PRED[j] holds,
then the execution of these instructions makes all local executions move
from their current configurations to themselves.
The cardinality of a set S is |S|. Assume that S is a set of integer
numbers; bijective and increasing function assignInd : S → {1, . . . , |S|}
assigns and returns a unique index of the element j in the set S. Function
fork(LECSj, k) makes a copy of the local execution pi[j]; the new execution
can be referred as EX[k] (notice that k is smaller than or equal to the
updated TOP ).
When MAP is activated, its configuration is {map.prg :piM ,map.mem :
mM}, where piM is the program of MAP tailored to the policy to be enforced
(for example, for non-interference the program of MAP is described in
Figure 4.2a), and mM is the memory of MAP from the last activation. The
execution of MAP terminates if skip is the only instruction in the MAP
program.
3.3.3 REDUCE
REDUCE controls the output actually generated by the enforcement mech-
anism. REDUCE can retrieve output items from a local output queue of
a local execution, send output items to the external output queue, clean
local output queues of local executions, wake local executions up, and kill
local executions.
Except for the input instruction that is replaced by the retrieve instruc-
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RETR
red.prg:piR = retrieve x from (j, c)
EX[j].out = O dequeue(O, c) = (val, O′) val 6= ⊥
∆, red.prg:piR, red.mem:mR ⇒ ∆, red.prg:skip, red.mem:mR[x 7→ val]
OUTR
red.prg:piR = output e to c
red.mem = mR ~v = ~⊥[c 7→ mR(e)]
∆, red.prg:piR, out:O ⇒ ∆, red.prg:skip, out:O.~v
WAKR
red.prg:piR = wake(PRED[ ])
S = {j ∈ {0, . . . , TOP} : PRED[j]}
LECS =
⋃
j∈S
{EX[j].int:sig, EX[j].stt:S} LECS′ =
⋃
j∈S
{EX[j].int:⊥, EX[j].stt:E}
∆, red.prg:piR, LECS⇒ ∆, red.prg:skip, LECS′
CLN
red.prg:piR = clean(c, PRED[ ])
S = {j ∈ {0, . . . , TOP} : PRED[j]}
LECS =
⋃
j∈S
{EX[j].out:O} LECS′ =
⋃
j∈S
{EX[j].out:remove(O, c)}
∆, red.prg:piR, LECS⇒ ∆, red.prg:skip, LECS′
KIL
red.prg:piR = kill(PRED[ ])
S = {j ∈ {0, . . . , TOP} : PRED[j]}
LECS =
⋃
0≤j≤TOP
LECSj LECS
′ = delete(LECS, S)
∆, red.prg:piR, top:TOP, LECS⇒ ∆, top:TOP − |S|, red.prg:skip, LECS′
Figure 3.8: Semantics of instructions of REDUCE
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tion, in addition to the instructions in Figure 3.1a, the program of the
REDUCE component may contain retrieve x from (j, c), clean(c, PRED[ ]),
wake(PRED[ ]), or kill(PRED[ ]) instructions which are described in Fig-
ure 3.1c. The execution of the retrieve instruction reads the value from the
output queue of pi[j]. The execution of clean, wake, or kill instruction is
applied to all local execution pi[j] such that PRED[j] is true. The exe-
cution of clean instruction removes the first vector ~v of the local output
queue of pi[j], where the value of ~v[c] is different from ⊥. The execution
of the kill instruction removes pi[j] from the array of local execution and
updates TOP . The execution of the wake instruction is similar to the one
of MAP.
The semantics of retrieve, output, wake clean, and kill instructions is
described in Figure 3.8, where function remove(O, c) used in rule CLN
removes the first vector ~v in O where ~v[c] 6= ⊥; assume that LECS is the
set of configurations of all local executions (i.e. LECS =
⋃
0≤j≤TOP LECSj),
and S is a subset of {0, . . . , TOP}, function delete(LECS, S) in rule KIL
removes configurations of local execution pi[j] (where j ∈ S) from LECS,
and reassign the indexes of the remained local executions such that the
order of local executions are maintained (i.e. for local executions pi[j] and
pi[k] such that j, k are not in S and j < k, after the application of the
function, these two local executions are referred with new indexes j′ and
k′ such that j′ < k′ ≤ TOP − |S|).
When REDUCE is activated, its configuration is {red.prg:piR, red.mem:
mR}, where piR is the program of REDUCE tailored to the policy to be
enforced (for example, for non-interference, the program of REDUCE is
described in Figure 4.2b), and mR is the memory of REDUCE from the last
activation. Similar to the execution of MAP, the execution of REDUCE
terminates if skip is the only instruction in the REDUCE program.
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3.4 Summary
Controlled programs can be composed of basic instructions which are as-
signment, condition, loop, skip, input and output instructions. Local exe-
cutions are copies of controlled programs. In addition to these instruction,
instructions available for MAP are map, wake and clone. For REDUCE,
additional instructions are retrieve, wake and kill. The small step opera-
tional semantics of controlled programs, local executions, MAP programs,
and REDUCE programs was specified.
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Chapter 4
Enforcement Mechanisms of
Information Flow Policies
This chapter illustrates the framework by presenting constructed
enforcement mechanisms of non-interference [20], non-deducibility
[45] and deletion of inputs [34]. Soundness and precision of the
constructed enforcement mechanisms are formally demonstrated.
4.1 Overview
To illustrate our framework, we next present enforcement mechanisms of
non-interference [20], non-deducibility [45], and deletion of inputs [34]. We
choose non-interference because it is enforced by secure multi-execution
[20], the mechanism that has drawn a lot of attention of researchers [9,
18, 38, 51, 50, 19, 47, 36] to multi-execution technique. Non-deducibility
and deletion of inputs are chosen to illustrate the idea that from an ex-
isting enforcement mechanism (e.g. the enforcement mechanism of non-
interference), by some modification, we can enforce another policy. Dele-
tion of inputs is also used to illustrate the clone instruction.
The chosen information flow policies are defined on a lattice with two
security levels: low (L) and high (H). An input or output channel is at
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either the low level or the high level. Items on channels at the low level
is visible to users at the low or high level, while items on channels at the
high level is visible only to users at the high level. Function lvl(c) returns
the level of channel c.
States of local executions. In the enforcement mechanisms of the selected
policies, initially all local executions are in executing states and all local
executions are executed in parallel. When a local execution needs an input
item that is not ready in its local input queue or when it generates an
output item, it emits an interrupt signal and move to a sleeping state. A
local execution will be waken up by REDUCE if its generated output item
has been processed. A local execution will be waken up by MAP if it has
already received the input item that it is waiting for. The condition for a
local execution to be waken up is encoded in function isReady(c).
From the semantics of the enforcement mechanism (Section 3.3), func-
tion isReady(c) is defined as in Equation 4.1, where EX[x].stt = S ∧
EX[x].prg = input y from c; pi means that local execution pi[x] is sleeping
and waiting for an input item from c, and EX[x].in = I ∧ dequeue(I, c) =
(val, I ′) ∧ val 6= ⊥ means that pi[x] has already received the input item
that it is waiting for.
isReady(c) , λx.EX[x].stt = S ∧ EX[x].prg = input y from c; pi ∧
EX[x].in = I ∧ dequeue(I, c) = (val, I ′) ∧ val 6= ⊥
(4.1)
Activation of MAP and REDUCE. The program of MAP is activated only
when the previous execution of MAP has terminated, there is an interrupt
signal (c) from local execution pi[j], the state of this local execution is
sleeping (S), and the instruction to be executed is the input instruction.
The resulting activation of MAP removes the signal from configuration of
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pi[j].
Function pick(S) returns an element from a non-empty set S. Such
selection can be non-deterministic or in a round-robin way. The chosen
selection does not influence our results. The predicate WAITI[ ] indicates
whether a local execution is waiting for an input item or not.
WAITI[ ] , λx.EX[x].stt = S ∧ ∃c ∈ Cin : EX[x].int = (c) ∧
EX[x].prg = input y from c; pi
(4.2)
Similarly to MAP, REDUCE can be activated when the previous exe-
cution of REDUCE has terminated, and there is an interrupt signal (c)
from the local execution pi[j], the state of this local execution is sleeping
(S), the instruction to be executed is an output instruction. The resulting
activation of REDUCE removes the signal from the configuration of pi[j].
Predicate WAITO[ ] indicates whether a local execution is sleeping on an
output instruction.
WAITO[ ] , λx.EX[x].stt = S ∧ ∃c ∈ Cout : EX[x].int = (c) ∧
EX[x].prg = output e to c; pi
(4.3)
Remark 4.1. Notice that as reported by Kashyap et al. [25], orders of
executing local executions influence security guarantees on timing and ter-
mination channels. We believe that the orders of executing local executions
reported in their work and the corresponding security guarantees can be
incorporated into our constructed enforcement mechanisms.
Common functions. The enforcement mechanisms of selected policies are
based on three functions canAsk(j, c), canBeTold(c), and canSend(j, c),
which specify privileges of local executions on input and output channels.
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MACTSAMPLE
map.prg:skip
S = {j ∈ {0, . . . , TOP} : WAITI[j]} S 6= ∅
j = pick(S) EX[j].prg = input x from c; pi
∆, EX[j].int:(c),map.prg:skip⇒ ∆, EX[j].int:⊥,map.prg:piM(j, c)
RACTSAMPLE
red.prg:skip
S = {j ∈ {0, . . . , TOP} : WAITO[j]} S 6= ∅
j = pick(S) EX[j].prg = output e to c; pi
∆, EX[j].int:(c), red.prg:skip⇒ ∆, EX[j].int:⊥, red.prg:piR(j, c)
Figure 4.1: Activation of MAP and REDUCE in constructed enforcement mechanisms
• Function canAsk(j, c) indicates whether local execution pi[j] can ask
MAP perform input operations on channel c.
• Function canBeTold(c) indicates whether local execution pi[x] can re-
ceive genuine values on channel c from MAP. The application of
canBeTold(c) on local execution pi[j] is written as canBeTold(c)[j].
• Function canSend(j, c) indicates whether local execution pi[j] can send
its generated output values to channel c.
Table 4.1 summarizes ideas of these functions for the enforcement mech-
anisms.
Another function which is used by the constructed enforcement mecha-
nisms is function identical(j) that returns true only when it is applied on
j and is defined as below:
identical(j) , λx.x = j (4.4)
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Table 4.1: Functions specifying privileges of local executions on channels used in sample
enforcement mechanisms
Function Non-interference Non-deducibility Deletions of in-
puts
canAsk(j, c) Only the high execu-
tion (resp. the low
execution) can ask for
input items from high
channels (resp. low
channels).
Only the shadow exe-
cution (resp. the low
execution) can ask for
input items from high
channels (resp. low
channels).
Privileges for high
and low execu-
tion are similar to
the ones of non-
interference. The
clones cannot ask
any input items.
canBeTold(c) The high execution can
be told all genuine
items. The low execu-
tions can be told gen-
uine items only from
low input channels.
High and shadow exe-
cutions can be told in-
put items from high in-
put channels. High
and low executions can
be told genuine input
items from low input
channels
Privileges for high
and low execu-
tion are similar
to the ones of
non-interference.
The clones can be
told genuine input
items from low
input channels.
canSend(j, c) Only the high execu-
tion (resp. low execu-
tion) can send output
items to high channels
(resp. low channels).
Similar to non-
interference.
Similar to non-
interference.
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4.2 Enforcement mechanism of non-interference
Let I|L (resp. O|L) return the projection of the input I (resp. output O)
containing only items on channels at the low level. For non-interference, for
two arbitrary inputs I and I ′ that are low-equivalent (i.e. I ′|L = I|L), the
generated outputs O and O′ are also low-equivalent (i.e. O′|L = O|L). Non-
interference comes in two flavors: termination-sensitive non-interference
and termination-insensitive non-interference. Termination-sensitive non-
interference is defined with assumption that attackers at the low level can
observe the terminations of executions of programs. This assumption is
not used in the definition of termination-insensitive non-interference.
Definition 4.2.1 (TINI). A program pi satisfies termination-insensitive
non-interference iff
∀I, I ′ : I|L = I ′|L ∧ (pi, I) ⇓ O ∧ (pi, I ′) ⇓ O′ =⇒ O|L = O′|L
Definition 4.2.2 (TSNI). A program pi satisfies termination-sensitive non-
interference iff
∀I, I ′ : I|L = I ′|L ∧ (pi, I) ⇓ O =⇒ (pi, I ′) ⇓ O′ ∧ O|L = O′|L
Enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism of non-interference
on a controlled program pi needs only two local executions: the high execu-
tion (pi[0]) and the low execution (pi[1]). The high execution is responsible
for asking input items from input channels at the high level and generating
output items sent to output channels at the high level. The low execution
is responsible for the corresponding ones at the low level. In the sequel,
the term high input items is used for input items from input channels at
the high level. Similarly, we have high output items, low input items, and
low output items.
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1: if canAskNI(j, c) then
2: input x from c
3: map(x, c, canBeToldNI(c))
4: map(~df [c], c,¬canBeToldNI(c))
5: wake(isReady(c))
6: else
7: if ¬canBeToldNI(c)[j] then
8: map(~df [c], c, identical(j))
9: wake(identical(j))
10: else
11: skip
12: end if
13: end if
(a) MAP for NI on an input request from local execution
pi[j] on channel c
1: if canSendNI(j, c) then
2: retrieve x from (j, c)
3: output x to c
4: end if
5: clean(c, identical(j))
6: wake(identical(j))
(b) REDUCE for NI on an output request from
local execution pi[j] on channel c
The low execution (pi[1]) cannot ask MAP to perform input operations on high input channels. When
it needs a high input item, MAP fetches it a fake value (~df [c]). Only the low execution (resp. the high
execution) can send its own generated output items to low channels (resp. high channels).
Figure 4.2: Programs of MAP and REDUCE for the enforcement mechanism of non-
interference
In order to enforce non-interference, we ensure that the execution of the
low execution is independent from high input items consumed by the high
execution. In addition, only the low execution can send output items to
low output channels. Thus, high input items do not influence consumed
low input items and generated low output items. These ideas are encoded
in the programs of MAP and REDUCE that are presented in respectively
Figure 4.2a, and Figure 4.2b, where ~df [c] returns the default value for
channel c.
Because the low execution is responsible for observation visible at the
low level, the low execution can ask MAP to perform input operations on
low input channels. The high execution cannot do so since if it can, the
consumed high input items influence the consumed low input items. For
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the low execution, if it can ask MAP to perform an input operation on
high input channels, the enforcement mechanism is still non-interferent.
However, for the controlled program that is already non-interferent, the
inputs consumed by the enforcement mechanism and the inputs consumed
by the controlled program might be different. In other words, the en-
forcement mechanism changes the behavior of programs that is already
non-interferent. Thus, MAP only perform input operations on high input
channels when it receives input request on these channels from the high
execution.
canAskNI(j, c) , (j = 0 ∧ lvl(c) = H) ∨ (j = 1 ∧ lvl(c) = L) (4.5)
Since the high execution generates high output items, it is natural for
the high execution being told genuine input items from high input channels.
Because non-interference allows low input items to influence the observa-
tion of users at the high level, this execution can also be told genuine input
items from low input channels. The low execution cannot receive genuine
values from high input channels since if it can, high output items will in-
fluence the observation visible to users at the low level. Put differently, the
enforcement mechanism fails to enforce non-interference. Thus, the low
execution can receive only genuine input items from low input channels.
canBeToldNI(c) , λx.(lvl(c) = H ∧ x = 0) ∨ (lvl(c) = L) (4.6)
The high (resp. low) execution is allowed to send its generated output
items to high (resp. low) output channels and it is not allowed to send
anything to low (resp. high) output channels.
canSendNI(j, c) , (j = 0 ∧ lvl(c) = H) ∨ (j = 1 ∧ lvl(c) = L) (4.7)
When MAP is activated on an input request from local execution pi[j] on
channel c, its path of execution depends on the privileges of local execution
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pi[j] on channel c. If local execution pi[j] can ask MAP to perform an input
operation on channel c (i.e. canAskNI(j, c) = T), MAP gets an input value
from the global input queue by performing an input operation (Figure 4.2a-
line 2), sends the asked value to all local executions that can be told genuine
values from channel c (i.e. canBeToldNI(c)) (Figure 4.2a-line 3), and sends
a fake value to others (Figure 4.2a-line 4). After that, MAP wakes local
executions that are sleeping and have already received the input items they
are waiting for (Figure 4.2a-line 5). If local execution pi[j] cannot ask MAP
to perform input operations on channel c, and this local execution cannot
be told genuine values from c (i.e. canBeToldNI(c)[j] = F), MAP sends
a fake value to this local execution (Figure 4.2a-line 8) and wakes it up
(Figure 4.2a-line 9).
As shown in Figure 4.2b, when REDUCE is activated on an output re-
quest from local execution pi[j] on channel c, it checks whether this exe-
cution can send its generated output items to channel c or not. If so (i.e.
canSendNI(j, c) = T), REDUCE retrieves the generated output item from
the local output queue of local execution pi[j] (Figure 4.2b-line 2) and sends
the retrieved output value to c (Figure 4.2b-line 3). Otherwise, no output
operation is performed. After that, the output queue of pi[j] is cleaned
(Figure 4.2b-line 5) and pi[j] is waken (Figure 4.2b-line 6).
Example 4.2.1. We illustrate the enforcement mechanism of non-interference
with the controlled program presented in Figure 3.2 and with input (cL1 =
T)(cH1 = M1), which means that the input contains two vectors, the first
one contains T from cL1, and the last one contains M1 from cH1. Default
values for channels cH1 and cH2 are respectively D1 and D2. We assume
that check(D1) = T (i.e. true) and check(M1) = F (i.e. false).
Executions of high execution and low execution are shown in respectively
Figure 4.3a and Figure 4.3b. At Figure 4.3a-line 1, the high execution sends
a request to MAP and moves to a sleeping state. MAP is activated. Since
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the high execution can be told low input items but cannot ask for them, there
is no input operation performed, no input item sent to the high execution,
and this execution keeps sleeping. At the first instruction, the low execution
sends a signal to MAP and moves to a sleeping state. MAP is activated,
gets input item T from the global queue, sends it to local input queues of
both local executions, and wake both local executions up.
When the output instruction at Figure 4.3a-line 7 of the high execution
is executed, REDUCE is activated. Since the high execution can send its
generated output values to cH3, REDUCE retrieves the output item gener-
ated by the high execution, sends the item to the global output queue, cleans
the output queue of the high execution, and wakes this execution up. When
the high execution executes the output instruction at Figure 4.3a-line 8,
REDUCE is also activated. Because the high execution cannot send output
item to low channels, REDUCE does not send any output item to cL2. No-
tice that when the low execution needs an input item from cH2, a fake input
item will be fetched to it by MAP.
The enforcement mechanism terminates and generates output (cH3 =
M1 + 0)(cL2 = D1 +D2). The values sent to cH3 and cL2 are respectively
M1 + 0 and D1 + D2. We describe the global input, output queues, and
local input, output queues in Figure 4.4, where each column in the tables
corresponds to an input/output operation.
At time 0, MAP consumes T from channel cL1 and sends this value to
local inputs of high and low executions. At time 1, MAP consumes value M1
from channel cH1, sends this value to the local input of the high execution,
and sends a fake value (D1) to the local input of the low execution. At time
3, when the low execution requests an input value from channel cH2, MAP
gives it a fake value (D2).
At time 3 and 4, REDUCE sends respectively the output value (M1 + 0)
from the high execution to channel cH3 and the output value (D1 + D2)
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1 input l1 from cL1
2 input h1 from cH1
3 h2 := 0
4 b := check(h1)
5 if l1 and b then
6 input h2 from cH2
7 output h1 + h2 to cH3
8 output h1 + h2 to cL2
//Use T asked by pi[1].
//Get M1 from cH1.
//b = F = check(M1).
//This instruction is not executed since b is F.
//Send M1 + 0 to cH3.
//The output is ignored.
(a) The high execution pi[0]
1 input l1 from cL1
2 input h1 from cH1
3 h2 := 0
4 b := check(h1)
5 if l1 and b then
6 input h2 from cH2
7 output h1 + h2 to cH3
8 output h1 + h2 to cL2
//Get T from cL1.
//A fake value D1 is used.
//b = T = check(D1).
//A fake value D2 is used.
//The output is ignored.
//Send D1 +D2 to cL2.
(b) The low execution pi[1]
Figure 4.3: Executions of local copies for non-interference
from the low execution to channel cL2. Output values of the high execution
to channel cL2 and output values of the low execution to channel cH3 are
ignored by REDUCE.
4.3 Enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs
Deletion of inputs [34] prevents attackers from deducing the occurrence of
the last high input event. The policy requires that if we perturb a possible
trace t = β.e.α (there is no high input event in α) by deleting the high
input event e, the result can be corrected into a possible trace t′ (t′ = β′.α′).
Parts β and β′ are equivalent on the low input events and the high input
events, and so are parts α and α′; parts α and α′ are also equivalent on
low output events.
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Input to MAP:
PPPPPPPPPPPChannel
Time
0 1
cH1 ⊥ M1
cH2 ⊥ ⊥
cL1 T ⊥
=⇒ MAP
Local Executions:
High execution pi[0]:
Local input: Local output:
cH1 ⊥ M1
cH2 ⊥ ⊥
cL1 T ⊥
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0
Low execution pi[1]:
Local input: Local output:
cH1 ⊥ D1 ⊥
cH2 ⊥ ⊥ D2
cL1 T ⊥ ⊥
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ D1+D2 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ D1+D2
REDUCE =⇒
Output by REDUCE:
PPPPPPPPPPPChannel
Time
0 1 2 3 4
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ D1+D2
Each column in the table corresponds to an input/output operation. At time 0 and 1 respectively, MAP
consumes value T and M1 from channel cL1 and cH1. It sends appropriate values to local inputs of local
executions. At time 2, MAP sends a fake value (D2) to the local input of the low execution. At time 3
and 4, REDUCE sends M1 + 0 and D1 +D2 to respectively cH3 and cL2.
Figure 4.4: Example of input and output queues for non-interference
In our notation, for a program to satisfy deletion of inputs, on any input
such that the execution of the program on this input terminates, the high
input item that follows by only low input items or high default items can be
replaced by a default item. The obtained input can be modified further by
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adding or removing default input items and the execution of the program
on the resulted input terminates and the output items generated at the
low level are not changed.
Put differently, w.r.t. ~df that maps input channels to default values,
a program satisfies deletion of input iff for any input I = I1.~v.I2, where
~v contains a value from high channel c (i.e. ~v[c] 6= ⊥ and lvl(c) = H)
and in I2 there are either no high items or only high items with default
values (i.e. I2|H = (~vdf)∗ and if ~vdf [c] contains a value from channel c′ then
~vdf [c
′] = ~df [c′]), and the execution of the program on I terminates, input I
can be changed by replacing ~v by a default vector; the obtained input can
be sanitized by removing existing default high input items in I2 or adding
other default high input items to I2. The sanitized input is consumed
completely by the program and the generated output is still low-equivalent
to the original output generated with input I (i.e. O′|L = O|L).
Definition 4.3.1 (DI). W.r.t. vector ~df that maps input channels to de-
fault values, a program pi satisfies deletion of inputs iff
∀I : I = I1.~v.I2 ∧ ~v[c] 6= ⊥ ∧ lvl(c) = H ∧ I2|H = (~vdf)∗ ∧ (pi, I) ⇓ O
=⇒ ∃I ′ : I ′ = I1.I ′2 ∧ I ′|L = I|L ∧ I ′2|H = (~vdf)∗ ∧ (pi, I ′) ⇓ O′ ∧ O′|L = O|L
where ~vdf is a vector that contains a default value (i.e. if ~vdf contains a
value from channel c′, then ~vdf [c′] = ~df [c′]).
Notice that in the definition of deletion of inputs, I2|H and I ′2|H may
have different lengths and may contain inputs from different high input
channels.
Enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism of deletion of in-
puts is similar to the one of non-interference except for the way handling
input requests from the high execution on high input channels. Whenever
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1: if beCloned(j, c) then
2: clone(identical(j))
3: end if
4: if canAskDI(j, c) then
5: input x from c
6: map(x, c, canTellDI(c))
7: map(~df [c], c,¬canTellDI(c))
8: wake(isReady(c))
9: else
10: if ¬canTellDI(c)[j] then
11: map(~df [c], c, identical(j))
12: wake(identical(j))
13: else
14: skip
15: end if
16: end if
(a) MAP for DI on an input request from local execution
pi[j] on channel c
1: if canSendDI(j, c) then
2: retrieve x from (j, c)
3: output x to c
4: end if
5: clean(c, identical(j))
6: wake(identical(j))
(b) REDUCE for DI on an output request
from local execution pi[j] on channel c
When the high execution needs a high input item, MAP creates a clone of the high execution. Only the
high execution receives the actual high input items. Clones of the high execution and the low execution
use fake high input items (~df [c]) sent by MAP. As in the enforcement mechanism of NI, only the high
execution (resp. the low execution) can send output items to high output channels (resp. low output
channels).
Figure 4.5: Programs of MAP and REDUCE for the enforcement mechanism of deletion of
inputs
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the high execution (pi[0]) requests a high input item, this execution will be
cloned. To ensure that clones do not influence the observation at the low
level, we force the clones not to ask MAP perform input operations on low
input channels and their outputs to low channels are ignored. Since a clone
is responsible to the execution with an input I ′ in the definition, it does
not receive genuine values from high channels and it has to reuse low input
items requested by the low execution (pi[1]). A clone cannot send outputs
to high channels (only the high execution can send its generated output
items to these channels). It is worth noting that clones can influence the
termination of the enforcement mechanism.
The program of MAP is in Figure 4.5. The program of REDUCE is as
in the one of the mechanism of non-interference. Function beCloned(j, c)
is defined as below:
beCloned(j, c) , j = 0 ∧ lvl(c) = H (4.8)
Functions canAskDI(j, c), canTellDI(c), and canSendDI(j, c) are as below.
Notice that in the enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs, the number
of local executions is not a constant since MAP can create clones of the
high execution.
canAskDI(j, c) , (j = 0 ∧ lvl(c) = H) ∨ (j = 1 ∧ lvl(c) = L) (4.9)
canTellDI(c) , λx.(lvl(c) = H ∧ x = 0) ∨ (lvl(c) = L) (4.10)
canSendDI(j, c) , (j = 0 ∧ lvl(c) = H) ∨ (j = 1 ∧ lvl(c) = L) (4.11)
Example 4.3.1. We illustrate the enforcement mechanism of deletion of
inputs with the controlled program presented in Figure 3.2. The input is
(cL1 = T)(cH1 = M3) (cH2 = M2), which means that the input contains
three vectors, the first vector contains T from cL1, the second vector con-
tains M3 from cH1, and the last one contains M2 from cH2. The default
values for channels cH1 and cH2 are respectively D1 and D2. We assume
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that check(D1) = T and check(M3) = T, where T denotes the boolean
value true.
The execution of the high copy is similar to the one in the enforcement
mechanism of non-interference, except that when it needs a high input item
(Figure 4.6a-line 2 or Figure 4.6a-line 6) , MAP creates a clone of it. The
execution of the low execution pi[1] is the same as the execution of the low
copy in the enforcement mechanism of non-interference. The execution of
the first clone pi[2] is similar to the execution of the low execution. The
second clone pi[3] is created when the high execution executes the input
instruction at Figure 4.6a-line 6. At this point, the high execution receives
the genuine item from cH2 while the second clone receives the default one.
All output items generated by clones are ignored by REDUCE.
The enforcement mechanism terminates and generates output (cH3 =
M3 +M2)(cL2 = D1 +D2). The values sent to cH3 and cL2 are respectively
M3 + M2 and D1 + D2. We describe the global input, output queues, and
local input, output queues in Figure 4.7, where each column in the tables
corresponds to an input/output operation.
At time 0, when receiving the request from the low execution, MAP con-
sumes value T from channel cL1, sends this value to local inputs of all local
executions. At time 1, MAP consumes M3 from channel cH1 when receiv-
ing the input request from the high execution. It creates the first clone and
sends M3 to the local input of the high execution and sends a fake value
(D1) to local inputs of the low execution and the first clone. At time 2,
MAP consumes M2 from channel cH2 and creates the second clone. MAP
then sends M2 to the local input of the high execution and sends a fake
value (D2) to local inputs of other local executions.
At time 3 and 4, REDUCE sends respectively the output value (M3 +M2)
from the high execution to channel cH3 and the output value (D1+D2) from
the low execution to channel cL2. Output values of the high execution to
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1 input l1 from cL1
2 input h1 from cH1
3 h2 := 0
4 b := check(h1)
5 if l1 and b then
6 input h2 from cH2
7 output h1 + h2 to cH3
8 output h1 + h2 to cL2
//Use T asked by pi[1].
//Get M3 from cH1. The first clone pi[2] is created.
//b = T = check(M3).
//Get M2 from cH2. The second clone pi[3] is created.
//Send M3 +M2 to cH3.
//The output is ignored.
(a) The high execution pi[0]
1 input l1 from cL1
2 input h1 from cH1
3 h2 := 0
4 b := check(h1)
5 if l1 and b then
6 input h2 from cH2
7 output h1 + h2 to cH3
8 output h1 + h2 to cL2
//Get T from cL1.
//A fake value D1 is used.
//b = T = check(D1).
//A fake value D2 is used.
//The output is ignored.
//Send D1 +D2 to cL2.
(b) The low execution pi[1]
1 input l1 from cL1
2 input h1 from cH1
3 h2 := 0
4 b := check(h1)
5 if l1 and b then
6 input h2 from cH2
7 output h1 + h2 to cH3
8 output h1 + h2 to cL2
//Use T asked by pi[1].
//Get M3 from cH1.
//b = T = check(M3).
//A fake value D2 is used.
//The output is ignored.
//The output is ignored.
(c) The second clone pi[3]
The execution pi[2] is created when the high execution needs an input item from cH1. The execution
of this copy is similar to the one of the low. The execution pi[3] is created when the high execution
requests a high input item from cH2. When pi[3] is created, it is sleeping at the input instruction at
Figure 4.6c-line 6. All output items generated by pi[2] and pi[3] are ignored by REDUCE.
Figure 4.6: Executions of local copies for deletion of inputs
channel cL2, output values of the low execution to channel cH3, outputs of
clones to all channels are ignored by REDUCE.
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Input to MAP:
PPPPPPPPPPPChannel
Time
0 1 2
cH1 ⊥ M3 ⊥
cH2 ⊥ ⊥ M2
cL1 T ⊥ ⊥
=⇒ MAP
Local Executions:
High execution pi[0]:
Local input: Local output:
cH1 ⊥ M3 ⊥
cH2 ⊥ ⊥ M2
cL1 T ⊥ ⊥
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M3 +M2 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M3 +M2
Low execution pi[1]:
Local input: Local output:
cH1 ⊥ D1 ⊥
cH2 ⊥ ⊥ D2
cL1 T ⊥ ⊥
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ D1 +D2 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ D1 +D2
Second clone pi[3]:
Local input: Local output:
cH1 ⊥ M3 ⊥
cH2 ⊥ ⊥ D2
cL1 T ⊥ ⊥
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M3 +D2 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M3 +D2
REDUCE =⇒
Output by REDUCE:
PPPPPPPPPPPChannel
Time
0 1 2 3 4
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M3 +M2 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ D1 +D2
Each column in the tables corresponds to an input/output operation. At time 0, MAP consumes T from
cL1 and sends this value to all local executions. At time 1, MAP consumes M3 from cH1, sends it to
the high execution, and sends D1 to other executions. At time 2, MAP consumes M2 from cH2, sends it
to the high execution, and sends D2 to other executions. At time 3 and 4, REDUCE sends respectively
M3 + 0 from the high execution to cH3, and D1 + D2 from the low execution to cL2. Local input and
local output of the first clone pi[2] are as of the low execution and hence are not described here.
Figure 4.7: Example of input and output queues for deletion of inputs
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4.4 Enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility
Sutherland defines non-deducibility by using two views: the first view cor-
responds to events that attackers at the low level could not deduce (e.g.
high input events), and the second view corresponds to observations of
attackers at the low level [45]. There are no flows from from the former
to the latter if the two views can always be combined. In this way an
attacker cannot know whether a particular sequence of events in the first
view took place, because it can be always replaced by another sequence
and the observation to the second view is not changed.
Let I|H return the projection of the input I containing only items at the
high level. Termination-insensitive non-deducibility requires that for any
two inputs I and I∗, such that the program terminates with these inputs,
there exists another input I∗∗, which is low-equivalent with I (I|L = I∗∗|L),
high-equivalent to I∗ (I∗|H = I∗∗|H), and if the program terminates with
I∗∗, the generated output visible to attackers at the low level is not changed.
Termination-sensitive non-deducibility assumes that attackers can observe
terminations of executions. It also assumes the existence of the default
view where all input items are default values. If the input with only default
values could not be accepted by an execution then it would be possible to
deduce that the sequence of genuine high input items is actually different
from the sequence of default values.
Definition 4.4.1 (TIND). A program pi satisfies termination-insensitive
non-deducibility iff
∀I, I∗ : (pi, I) ⇓ O ∧ (pi, I∗) ⇓ O∗ =⇒ (∃I∗∗ : I|L = I∗∗|L ∧ I∗|H = I∗∗|H
∧ ((pi, I∗∗) ⇓ O∗∗ =⇒ O|L = O∗∗|L))
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1: if canAskND(j, c) then
2: input x from c
3: map(x, c, canBeToldND(c))
4: map(~df [c], c,¬canBeToldND(c))
5: wake(isReady(c))
6: else
7: if ¬canBeToldND(c)[j] then
8: map(~df [c], c, identical(j))
9: wake(identical(j))
10: else
11: skip
12: end if
13: end if
(a) MAP for ND on an input request from local exe-
cution pi[j] on channel c
1: if canSendNI(j, c) then
2: retrieve x from (j, c)
3: output x to c
4: end if
5: clean(c, identical(j))
6: wake(identical(j))
(b) REDUCE for ND on an output request from lo-
cal execution pi[j] on channel c
Only the shadow execution can ask MAP to perform input operations on high input channels. The
shadow execution cannot be told genuine input items from low input channels and it has to use fake
values for low input items. MAP does not perform input operations when it receives input requests from
the high execution. The high execution reuses genuine items asked by shadow and low executions. The
high execution is the only one that can send output items to high output channels.
Figure 4.8: Programs of MAP and REDUCE for the enforcement mechanism of non-
deducibility
Definition 4.4.2 (TSND). W.r.t. vector ~df that maps input channels to
default values, a program pi satisfies termination-sensitive non-deducibility
iff
∀I, I∗ : (pi, I) ⇓ O ∧ (pi, I∗) ⇓ O∗ =⇒ (∃I∗∗ : I|L = I∗∗|L ∧ I∗|H = I∗∗|H
∧ (pi, I∗∗) ⇓ O∗∗ ∧ O|L = O∗∗|L)
and the execution with the input that contains only default values specified
by ~df is always present and terminates.
Enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility
has three local executions: the high execution (pi[0]), the shadow execu-
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tion (pi[1]), and the low execution (pi[2]). To enforce non-deducibility, we
configure the mechanism such that the consumed high input items and
the consumed low input items are independent. Thus, any combination
between the high inputs and the low inputs are always possible.
In order to ensure that the consumed high input items do not influ-
ence the consumed low input items, as in the enforcement mechanism of
non-interference, we require that MAP performs input operations on low
input channels only on input request from the low execution. When this
execution needs a high input item, MAP fetches it a default value.
In order to guarantee that low input items do not determine high inputs,
we need the shadow execution. Indeed the shadow execution is the only
one that can ask MAP to consume input items on high channels. However,
the shadow execution can only receives fake (default) low input items. We
use the word shadow as its generated output items are ignored by REDUCE
(only legitimate output items from the high execution are going to be sent
to high output channels).
The high execution here cannot request MAP to perform input opera-
tions on high input channels. It can be told genuine values from high input
channels (which are asked by the shadow execution), and genuine values
from low input channels (which are asked by the low execution). The high
execution is the only one that can send output items to high channels.
The programs of MAP and REDUCE are similar to the corresponding
ones for the enforcement mechanism of non-interference, except that func-
tions canAskND(j, c), canBeToldND(c), and canSendND(j, c) are redefined.
canAskND(j, c) , (j = 1 ∧ lvl(c) = H) ∨ (j = 2 ∧ lvl(c) = L) (4.12)
canBeToldND(c) , λx. (lvl(c) = H ∧ (x = 0 ∨ x = 1)) ∨
(lvl(c) = L ∧ (x = 0 ∨ x = 2)) (4.13)
canSendND(j, c) , (j = 0 ∧ lvl(c) = H) ∨ (j = 2 ∧ lvl(c) = L) (4.14)
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Example 4.4.1. We illustrate the enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility
on the controlled program presented in Figure 3.2 with the input (cL1 =
T)(cH1 = M1), which means that the input contains two vectors, the first
one contains T from cL1, and the last one contains M1 from cH1. The fake
values for channels cH1 and cL1 are respectively D1 and F. We assume
that check(D1) = T (i.e. true) and check(M1) = F (i.e. false).
The execution of the low execution is the same as the one in the en-
forcement mechanism of non-interference. Both high and shadow execu-
tions execute instructions from line 1 to 5, and from line 7 to 8. At Fig-
ure 4.9b-line 1, the shadow execution consumes a fake value (F) returned
by MAP. At Figure 4.9b-line 2, it consumes an input from cH1. All output
values generated by the shadow execution at Figure 4.9b-lines 7 and 8 are
ignored. The high execution reuses the input items asked by the low exe-
cution (Figure 4.9a-line 1) and the shadow execution (Figure 4.9a-line 2).
The execution of output instructions of the high execution is the same as
the ones in the enforcement mechanism of non-interference.
The enforcement mechanism terminates and generates output (cH3 =
M1 + 0)(cL2 = D1 +D2). The values sent to cH3 and cL2 are respectively
M1 + 0 and D1 + D2. We describe the global input, output queues, and
local input, output queues in Figure 4.10, where each column in the tables
corresponds to an input/output operation.
At time 0, on the input request from the low execution, MAP consumes
T from channel cL1 and sends this value to local inputs of all local exe-
cutions. At time 1, on the input request from the shadow execution, MAP
consumes M1 from channel cH1, sends this value to local inputs of high
and shadow executions, and sends a fake value (D1) to the local input of
the low execution. At time 2, when the low execution needs an input item
from channel cH2, MAP gives it a fake value (D2).
At time 3 and 4, REDUCE sends respectively the output value (M1 + 0)
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1 input l1 from cL1
2 input h1 from cH1
3 h2 := 0
4 b := check(h1)
5 if l1 and b then
6 input h2 from cH2
7 output h1 + h2 to cH3
8 output h1 + h2 to cL2
//Use T asked by the low execution.
//Use M1 asked by the shadow execution.
//b = F = check(M1).
//This instruction is not executed since b is F.
//Send M1 + 0 to cH3.
//The output is ignored.
(a) The high execution pi[0]
1 input l1 from cL1
2 input h1 from cH1
3 h2 := 0
4 b := check(h1)
5 if l1 and b then
6 input h2 from cH2
7 output h1 + h2 to cH3
8 output h1 + h2 to cL2
//A fake value F is used
//Get M1 from cH1.
//b = F = check(M1).
//This instruction is not executed since b and l1 are F.
//The output is ignored.
//The output is ignored.
(b) The shadow execution pi[1]
1 input l1 from cL1
2 input h1 from cH1
3 h2 := 0
4 b := check(h1)
5 if l1 and b then
6 input h2 from cH2
7 output h1 + h2 to cH3
8 output h1 + h2 to cL2
//Get T from cL1.
//A fake value D1 is used.
//b = T = check(D1).
//A fake value D2 is used.
//The output is ignored.
//Send D1 +D2 to cL2.
(c) The low execution pi[2]
Figure 4.9: Executions of local copies for the enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility
from the high execution to channel cH3 and the output value (D1 + D2)
from the low execution to channel cL2. Output values of the high execution
to channel cL2, output values of the low execution to channel cH3, and
output values of shadow executions are ignored by REDUCE.
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Input to MAP:
PPPPPPPPPPPChannel
Time
0 1
cH1 ⊥ M1
cH2 ⊥ ⊥
cL1 T ⊥
=⇒ MAP
Local Executions:
High execution pi[0]:
Local input: Local output:
cH1 ⊥ M1
cH2 ⊥ ⊥
cL1 T ⊥
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0
Shadow execution pi[1]:
Local input: Local output:
cH1 ⊥ M1
cH2 ⊥ ⊥
cL1 F ⊥
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0
Low execution pi[2]:
Local input: Local output:
cH1 ⊥ D1 ⊥
cH2 ⊥ ⊥ D2
cL1 T ⊥ ⊥
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ D1+D2 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ D1+D2
REDUCE =⇒
Output by REDUCE:
PPPPPPPPPPPChannel
Time
0 1 2 3 4
cH3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ M1 + 0 ⊥
cL2 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ D1+D2
Each column in the tables corresponds to an input/output operation. At time 0, MAP consumes T from
cL1 and sends it to all local executions. At time 1, MAP consumes M1 from cH1, sends it to high and
shadow executions, and sends D1 to the low execution. At time 2, when the low execution needs a value
from cH2, MAP gives it a fake value. At time 3 and 4, REDUCE sends respectively M1 + 0 from the high
execution to cH3, and D1 +D2 from the low execution to cL2.
Figure 4.10: Example of input and output queues for non-deducibility
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4.5 Soundness of constructed enforcement mechanisms
The soundness property states that the instantiated enforcement mecha-
nism correctly enforces the desired policy on an arbitrary program [20, 18].
Soundness does not hold for enforcement mechanisms of sample termination-
sensitive policies because one local execution might terminate but the oth-
ers might not. Thus, the whole enforcement mechanism does not terminate.
Definition 4.5.1. For a policy P, its enforcement mechanism EMP is
sound iff for any program pi, EMP(pi) satisfies P.
Theorem 4.5.1. Enforcement mechanisms of termination-insensitive non-
interference, termination-insensitive non-deducibility, and deletion of in-
puts are sound.
The proof strategy of soundness is sketched in Fig. 4.11. In order to
prove soundness, we state two basic properties specifying the behaviour
of MAP on receiving requests for low input items and the behaviour of
REDUCE when receiving an output request from a local execution. For the
actual proof of the theorem, we perform a case-based reasoning showing
that at the end, the output is what we expect. In this respect an important
assumption is that the program to be enforced is deterministic. In addition
to these two basic properties, we need an additional preliminary property
showing the relationship between the execution of a controlled program
and the corresponding local execution. For deletion of inputs, we need
another preliminary property about the input items that can be consumed
by clones (pi[j] where j > 1).
Proposition 4.5.1 (Input items consumed by enforcement mechanisms
and input items sent to local input queues of local executions). Consider
the enforcement mechanisms of sample information flow policies, it follows
that:
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Prop. 4.5.1
Input of EM(π)
Prop. 4.5.2
Output of EM(π)
Non-interferenceNon-deducibility
Prop. 4.5.3
Semantics 
Equivalence
Prop. 4.5.4
Clones in DI
Deletion of 
inputs
similar
Proposition 4.5.1 is about inputs consumed by the enforcement mechanisms, and the relationships be-
tween those inputs and inputs of local executions. Proposition 4.5.2 is about outputs generated by the
mechanisms, and the relationships between those outputs with outputs of local executions. The controlled
program and local executions handle their input differently. However, if they receive same input items
on all channels, their outputs are the same. This fact is proven in Proposition 4.5.3. Proposition 4.5.4 is
about the influence of clones on input and outputs of the enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs.
Figure 4.11: Proof strategy for soundness of constructed enforcement mechanisms
• MAP will only ask low input items from the environment for low input
requests from the low execution. The low execution can only receive
default values for high input items. This local execution can receive
real values for low input items.
• For the enforcement mechanism of non-interference and deletion of
inputs, MAP will only ask high input items from the environment for
high input requests from the high execution.
• For the enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs, the clones (pi[j]
with j > 1) receive real values for low input items, and receive default
values for high input items.
• For the enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility, MAP will ask
high input items from the environment for high input request from
the shadow execution.
• For the enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility, the shadow exe-
cution can receive only real values for high input items. It receives
default values for low input items.
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• The high execution of the enforcement mechanism of non-interference,
non-deducibility or deletion of inputs can receive real values for low
and high input items.
Proof. The proposition is obvious from the configurations of the corre-
sponding enforcement mechanisms, where all input items in local input
queues are sent by MAP; and only MAP can get input items from the
environment.
The proposition is proven by using the induction technique on the num-
ber of times of activation of MAP on input requests from local executions.
Let k be the number of times of activation of MAP on the input request.
For the base case, k = 0, we can check that the proposition holds
vacuously. Assume that the proposition holds for the case that k < n.
We now prove that the proposition holds for k = n. We consider the n-th
activation of MAP on a request from pi[j] on channel c. Notice that:
• Each instruction of MAP, REDUCE, and local executions is executed
atomically,
• MAP and REDUCE are executed separately,
• Local executions are executed separately,
• Local executions interact with MAP and REDUCE via interrupt sig-
nals. The execution of a local execution does not influence the execu-
tions of MAP and REDUCE.
Therefore, we have:
• Case 1: j = 0
– Case 1.1: lvl(c) = L (the high execution asks a low input item):
For non-interference, the instructions at lines 1, 7 and 11 in Fig. 4.2a
are executed. For deletion of inputs, the instructions at lines 1, 4
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and 14 in Fig. 4.5a are executed. MAP does not perform any in-
put action. This activation does not influence the items received
by the low execution. For non-deducibility, the instructions at
lines 1, 7, and 11 in Fig. 4.8a are executed. In all the constructed
enforcement mechanisms, the high execution keeps sleeping.
– Case 1.2: lvl(c) = H (the high execution asks a high input item):
For non-interference, the instructions from line 1 to 5 in Fig. 4.2a
are executed. MAP performs an input action and sends a default
value to the local input queue of the low execution, and the real
value to the local input queue of the high execution. For deletion
of inputs, the instructions from line 1 to 8 in Fig. 4.5a are exe-
cuted. MAP performs actions as in the case of non-interference.
In addition, it also makes a clone of the high execution and fetch a
default value to local input queues of clones. For non-deducibility,
the instructions at lines 1, 7, 11 in Fig. 4.8a are executed. The
high execution keeps sleeping.
• Case 2: j = 1.
– Case 2.1: lvl(c) = L: For non-interference, the instructions exe-
cuted are the same as the ones in Case 1.2. For deletion of inputs,
the instructions executed are also the same as the ones in Case 1.2
except for the clone instruction at line 2 in Fig. 4.5a that is not
executed. In the enforcement mechanisms of non-interference and
deletion of inputs, the real value is sent to the local input queues
of all local executions. For non-deducibility, the instructions at
lines 1, 7, 8, 9 in Fig. 4.8a are executed. MAP sends a default
value to the shadow execution.
– Case 2.2: lvl(c) = H: For non-interference, (respectively deletion
of inputs), the default value is sent to the local input queue of
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pi[1] by the execution of the instruction at line 8 in Fig. 4.2a
(resp. line 11 in Fig. 4.5a). For non-deducibility, the instructions
from line 1 to 5 in Fig. 4.8a are executed. MAP performs an input
action, sends the read value to high and shadow executions, and
sends a default value to the low execution.
• Case 3: j = 2 (only for the enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility)
– Case 3.1: lvl(c) = H (the low execution asks a high input item):
the instructions at lines 1, 7, 8, 9 in Fig. 4.8a are executed. MAP
sends a default value to the low.
– Case 3.2: lvl(c) = L (the low execution asks a low input item):
the instructions from line 1 to 5 in Fig. 4.8a are executed. MAP
performs an input action and sends a default value to the local
input queue of the shadow execution, and the real value to local
input queues of high execution and low execution.
• Case 4: j > 1 (only for the enforcement mechanism of deletion of
inputs)
– Case 4.1: lvl(c) = L: (a clone asks a low input item) MAP does
not perform any input actions. MAP does not send any input
item to the local input queue (line 14 in Fig. 4.5a).
– Case 4.2: lvl(c) = H: (a clone asks a high input item) MAP will
send only a default input item to the local input queue of pi[j]
(line 11 in Fig. 4.5a).
The proposition holds for k = n. Therefore, the proposition holds for
all k ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.5.2 (Outputs of enforcement mechanisms). Concerning the
output of enforcement mechanisms of sample information flow policies, it
follows that:
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• For the enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility, non-interference,
or deletion of inputs, only the high execution pi[0] sends output items
to high output channels.
• For the enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility, non-interference,
or deletion of inputs, only the low execution (pi[2] in the enforcement
mechanism of non-deducibility, pi[1] in the enforcement mechanism of
non-interference, or pi[1] in the enforcement mechanism of deletion of
inputs) can send output items to low output channels.
• For the enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs, the output items
generated by the local execution pi[j] with j > 1 are ignored.
Proof. The proposition is proven by using the induction technique on the
number of times of activation of REDUCE on output requests from local
executions. The proof is similar to the proof of Prop. 4.5.1.
For the proof of the soundness of the constructed enforcement mecha-
nisms, we need a property stating the relationship between the controlled
program and a local execution. We also need another simple property
showing how MAP handles the high input requests from local executions.
Proposition 4.5.3 (Controlled programs and local executions). Let I1 and
I2 be two input queues, such that for all input channels c, I1|c = I2|c. Then
we have: for all programs pi,
∀I1 : (pi, I1, )_k (pik, I1k, Ok) =⇒
∀I2 : ∀c ∈ Cin : I1|c = I2|c : (pi, I2, )⇒k (pik, I2k, Ok)
and I1k|c = I2k|c for all c.
And we have:
∀I1 : (pi, I1, )⇒k (pik, I1k, Ok) =⇒
∃I2 : ∀c ∈ Cin : I1|c = I2|c : (pi, I2, )_k (pik, I2k, Ok)
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and I1k|c = I2k|c for all c.
Proof. The proposition is proven by using the induction technique on k
and the length of the input queue I1, along with the fact that controlled
programs and the local executions are deterministic.
4.5.1 Soundness of mechanism of non-interference
Proof. Let us consider two executions: (EM(pi), I) ⇓ O and (EM(pi), I ′) ⇓
O′, where I|L = I ′|L.
The following holds:
1. The low input items consumed by the enforcement mechanism de-
pends only on the low execution (by Prop. 4.5.1).
2. The low executions in the runs of the enforcement mechanism on I and
I ′ always consume default values for high input items (by Prop 4.5.1).
3. The low executions in these two runs consume the same low input
items and same high output items. (By 1, 2 and pi be deterministic).
4. These low executions generate the same outputs (By 3 and the fact
that pi is deterministic).
5. The output items sent to low output channels are always generated
by the low executions (by Prop 4.5.2).
6. O|L = O′|L (by 4 and 5, and Prop. 4.5.3.)
This concludes the proof.
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4.5.2 Soundness of mechanism of deletion of inputs
To prove the soundness of the enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs,
we need a proposition showing the influence of local execution pi[j] (with
j > 1) on the input consumed by the enforcement mechanism.
Proposition 4.5.4. For the enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs,
clones of the high execution (pi[j] with j > 1) has no effect on the input
consumed by the enforcement mechanism.
Proof. The proof is obvious from the configuration of the enforcement
mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 4.5.1 for the enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs.
The idea of the enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs is that when
the high execution requests a high input item, the high execution will
be duplicated and the newly duplicated execution will receive the default
values for high input items. If we replace the last high input item in the
original input I with a default item, then there exists another input queue
satisfying the definition of deletion of inputs. Such an input queue is the
input consumed by the pi[TOP ].
Let I be an input, such that (EM(pi), I) ⇓ O. The proof of soundness of
the enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs is based on the induction
technique on the number of high input item in I.
Base case: since there is no high input item in I, the theorem holds
vacuously.
We assume that the theorem holds for all I, such that the number of
high input items is smaller than n. We now need to prove that the theorem
also holds for the case when the number of high input items is equal to n.
Now I can be written as I1.~v1. . . . .In.~vn.In+1
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Based on the configuration of the enforcement mechanism, pi[TOP ] is
created when the high execution requests the last high input item. Let
ITOPrc be the input consumed by pi[TOP ], I
1
rc be the input consumed by
pi[1]. We have:
1. ITOPrc = I1.~v1. . . . .In.~vdf .I
′
n+1, where I
′
n+1|H = (~vdf)∗.
2. I|L = I1rc|L
Let I∗ be an input queue, such that
I∗ = I1. . . . .In.In+1.~v1. . . . .~vn−1.~vdf .I∗n+1,
where I∗n+1 = I
′
n+1|H . Assume that the order of executing local executions
is first pi[1], then pi[0]. We have:
3. I∗|L = I|L.
4. The low execution will consume the part I1. . . . .In.In+1 for low input
items and default values for high input items (by Prop 4.5.1).
5. The high execution pi[0] will consume ~v1. . . . ~vn−1.~vdf .I∗n+1 (by 1 and
Prop. 4.5.3).
6. For every j, such that 1 < j ≤ TOP , the execution of the local
execution pi[j] terminates and it does not effect the input consumed by
the enforcement mechanism (by the assumption that (EM(pi), I) ⇓ O
and Prop. 4.5.4).
7. I∗ is consumed completely by the enforcement mechanism (by 4 and
5).
8. The high execution terminates (by the assumption that (EM(pi), I) ⇓
O).
9. (EM(pi), I∗) ⇓ O∗ (by 6, 7, 8).
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10. O∗|L = O|L (by Prop. 4.5.2 and Prop. 4.5.3).
From 3, 9, and 10, the theorem holds for the case of the number of high
input item in I is n. Therefore, the theorem holds for the enforcement
mechanism of deletion of inputs.
4.5.3 Soundness of mechanism of non-deducibility
Proof. For an arbitrary pair input (I, I∗) where (pi, I) ⇓ O and (pi, I∗) ⇓ O∗,
we first check the existence of I∗∗ such that I∗|H = I∗∗|H , I|L = I∗∗|L and
O|L = O∗∗|L.
Considering an input I such that (EM(pi), I) ⇓ O, we have:
1. (pi[j], Ij) ⇓ Oj, where 0 ≤ j ≤ TOP (TOP = 2), and Ij and Oj are
respectively the input consumed and output generated by pi[j].
2. The low execution pi[2] can ask and be told real values for low input
items. It can generate output for low output channels (by Prop. 4.5.1,
Prop. 4.5.2) . Therefore: I|L = I2|L, I2|H = (~vdf)∗, and O|L = O2|L.
3. The shadow execution pi[1] can ask and be told real values for high in-
put channels. It uses fake values for low input channels (by Prop. 4.5.1,
Prop. 4.5.2).
4. The high execution pi[0] cannot ask but can be told real values from
any channel (by Prop. 4.5.1, Prop. 4.5.2).
5. From 3 and 4, I|H = I1|H and I1|L = (~vdf)∗.
We next consider two inputs I and I∗ such that (EM(pi), I) ⇓ O, and
(EM(pi), I∗) ⇓ O∗. Let us investigate the running of the enforcement mech-
anism on I∗∗ such that I∗∗|H = I∗|H and I∗∗|L = I|L. Based on the con-
struction of the enforcement mechanism, the running of the enforcement
mechanism on I∗∗:
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6. From 3, the input consumed by the shadow execution is I∗∗1 where
I∗∗|H = I∗|H and I∗∗|L = (~vdf)∗. Since (EM(pi), I∗) ⇓ O∗, the shadow
execution terminates(pi[1], I∗∗1 ) ⇓ O∗∗1 .
7. From 2, the input consumed by the low execution is I∗∗2 where I
∗∗
2 |L =
I|L and I∗∗2 |H = (~vdf)∗. Since (EM(pi), I) ⇓ O, the low execution
terminates (pi[2], I∗∗2 ) ⇓ O∗∗2 .
8. The high execution consumes partially I∗∗. It cannot influence the
input consumed by the mechanism (by Prop. 4.5.1).
From 6, 7, and 8, there exist I∗∗ such that I∗∗|H = I∗|H and I∗∗|L = I|L.
If (EM(pi), I∗∗) ⇓ O∗∗, then O∗∗|L = O|L (by 7, Prop. 4.5.2, and Prop. 4.5.3).
In other words, the definition of TIND holds for the arbitrary input pair
(I, I∗). This concludes the proof.
4.6 Precision of constructed enforcement mechanisms
The notion of precision for enforcement of a property is taken from [20, 18].
The intuition is that the instantiated enforcement mechanism does not
change the visible behavior of a program that is secure with respect to the
property (and in particular the I/O behaviour on specific channels).
Definition 4.6.1. An enforcement mechanism is precise w.r.t. a policy
iff for any program pi satisfying the property, and for every input I, where
(pi, I) ⇓ O, the actually consumed input I∗ and the actual output O∗ of the
enforcement mechanism, regardless of the order of executing local execu-
tions, are such that the enforcement mechanism terminates and I∗|c = I|c
and O∗|c = O|c for all channels c.
Theorem 4.6.1. Enforcement mechanisms of termination-sensitive non-
interference, termination-sensitive non-deducibility, deletions of inputs are
precise.
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Proposition 4.5.2 is about outputs generated by the mechanisms, and the relationships between those
outputs with outputs of local executions. The controlled program and local executions handle their
input differently. However, if they receive same input items on all channels, their outputs are the same.
This fact is proven in Proposition 4.5.3. Proposition 4.6.1 is about the usage of local inputs of local
executions. Proposition 4.6.2 is about the transitions from sleeping states to executing states of local
executions. Proposition 4.6.3 is about the relationship between the input of the enforcement mechanism
and the input of the high execution. Lemma 4.6.1 is about the input consumed by an enforcement
mechanism of non-interference on a program satisfying TSNI. Similarly, Lemma 4.6.2 is about the inut
consumed by the enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility on a program satisfying TSND. The proof
of the precision of the enforcement mechanism of deletion of inputs follows the structure of the one of
non-interference.
Figure 4.12: Proof strategy for precision of constructed enforcement mechanisms
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Figure 4.12 shows the proof strategy for precision. The proof of precision
is more complex than the proof of soundness. At first, we need to prove
a number of simple properties on the correct handling of interrupt signals
and the equivalence between the semantics of controlled programs and the
semantics of local executions.
Proposition 4.6.1 (Local executions and local input queues). For a local
execution, when the input instruction is executed, if the input item required
is in its local input queue, this item will be consumed. Otherwise, an in-
terrupt signal is generated.
Proof. Proof follows obviously from the semantics of local executions.
Proposition 4.6.2 (The wake of local executions). The following facts
hold:
1. If a local execution is sleeping on an input instruction that required
an input item from the channel c, this local execution will be waken
up when the input item is ready and the instruction of piM executed is
the wake instruction. In addition, when a local execution is awaken,
there is no interrupt signal in its configuration.
2. A local execution is not awaken when the input item required is not
ready or when the input item required is ready, but the instruction
executed of piM is not the wake instruction.
Proof. Proof follows by induction on the length of the derivation sequence
of the enforcement mechanism.
Next we show that from pi[0]’s input, we can reconstruct the original
global input.
Proposition 4.6.3 (Global input and local inputs). Let k be the number
steps of derivation of the execution of the enforcement mechanism of NI,
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DI, or ND. Assume that we have (EM(pi), I, ) ⇒k (EM(pi)k, Ik, Ok), and
I0rck is the queue of the input items that have been received by pi[0], then it
follows that:
• I0rck.Ik = I
Proof. The lemma is proven by using the induction technique on the length
of the global input queue and the length of the derivation sequence of
the enforcement mechanism, along with the fact that the execution of the
controlled program and the executions of local executions are deterministic.
4.6.1 Precision of mechanism of non-interference
At this point, we have all that is needed to present the key lemma for the
proof of precision for non-interference that shows that all inputs have been
processed and there is nothing left within the enforcement mechanism.
Lemma 4.6.1 (Inputs of a controlled program and inputs consumed by
the corresponding enforcement mechanism). Let pi be a program satisfying
termination sensitive non-interference and (pi, I) ⇓ O. Regardless of the
order of executing local executions, if the low execution consumes the same
low input items as in I, and the high execution consumes high input and
low input items as in I, then it follows that the execution of the enforce-
ment mechanism terminates, and the input consumed by the enforcement
mechanism is I∗, where I∗|c = I|c for all c.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is based on the proposition of equivalence
between semantics of controlled programs and semantics of local executions
(Prop. 4.5.3) and the proposition of the relationships between the global
input queue and local input queues (Prop. 4.6.3).
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According to the semantics of the enforcement mechanism of NI, the
high execution does not influence the termination of the low execution, the
input consumed and the output generated by the low execution.
Therefore, regardless of the order of executing local executions, if the
low execution consumes the same low input items as in I, then the input
consumed by the low execution is I|L.(~vdf)∗.Ia, where Ia contains only low
input items. We next prove that Ia =  and the low execution terminates.
• Assume that Ia 6= . This means there exists an execution of pi on in-
put I ′, where I ′|L = I|L.Ia and I ′|H = (~vdf)∗. Since pi is deterministic,
this case cannot happen.
• Assume that pi[1] does not terminate. However, this leads to the
conclusion that pi does not satisfy TSNI.
We now prove that the high execution also terminates and does not
request any high input item that is not in I.
• Case 1: Assume that the high execution is stuck on a request for
low input items. If the high input execution needs a low input item,
the enforcement mechanism will behave accordingly to Prop. 4.6.1
and Prop. 4.6.2. The high execution is stuck on low input items
when it requests for an input item that is never requested by the low
execution. Since the low input items consumed by the low execution
is I|L, the stuck of the high execution leads to the conclusion that pi
is non-deterministic (notice that pi and pi[0] (the high execution) are
equivalent, that is if they receive the same input, they have the same
behavior).
• Case 2: The high execution requests a high input items that is not in
I. Regarding this assumption, because of Prop. 4.5.3, there are two
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instances of pi that consume some input items, but at some point run
in different paths of execution. In other words, pi is non-deterministic.
• Case 3: The high execution receives all input items it needs, but is
in an infinite loop. This case also leads to the conclusion that pi is
non-deterministic.
Therefore both local executions terminate. Let I0rc be the input queue
received by pi[0]. Since pi[0] does not request any other input items that
are not in I, then I0rc|c = I|c. From Prop. 4.6.3, we have I∗ = I0rc. Thus
I∗|c = I|c and (EM(pi), I∗) ⇓ O∗.
We have now all that is needed for the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.6.1 for the enforcement mechanism of non-interference.
Let I be an input queue, such that (pi, I) ⇓ O. We need to prove that
regardless of the order of executing local execution, the input I∗ and output
Oj will be such that I∗|c = I|c, O∗|c = O|c, and (EM(pi), I∗) ⇓ O∗.
The proof of precision of the enforcement mechanism of non-interference
is based on Lem. 4.6.1 and Prop. 4.5.2. We have:
• Regardless of the order of executing local execution, the input I∗ and
output O∗ will be such that I∗|c = I|c, and (EM(pi), I∗) ⇓ O∗ (by
Lem. 4.6.1).
• O∗|c = O|c (by Prop. 4.5.2 and pi satisfying TSNI).
Therefore, the theorem holds for the enforcement mechanism of non-
interference.
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4.6.2 Precision of mechanism of deletion of inputs
The proof for the precision of the enforcement mechanism of deletion of
inputs follows the same structure as the one of non-interference. We first
prove that regardless of the order of executing local execution, if the con-
trolled program is a good program, then the input consumed by the en-
forcement mechanism (i.e. I∗) and the input consumed by the original
controlled program (i.e. I) are equal on all channels (i.e. I∗|c = I|c for all
input channels c).
4.6.3 Precision of mechanism of non-deducibility
To prove the precision of enforcement of TSND, we also need a key lemma
about the input consumed by the enforcement mechanism.
Lemma 4.6.2 (Input consumption of the enforcement mechanism of non-d-
educibility). Let pi be a program satisfying termination sensitive non-deducibility,
and (pi, I) ⇓ O. Regardless of the order of executing local executions, if the
low execution consumes the same low input items as in I, and the shadow
execution consumes the same high input items as in I, then it follows that
the execution of the enforcement mechanism terminates, and the input con-
sumed by the enforcement mechanism is I∗, where I∗|c = I|c for all c.
Proof. We have that pi satisfies TSND, and (pi, I) ⇓ O. We write I as
IH .IL where IH (resp. IL) is an input containing only high (resp.) low
input items. Let ID be an input that contains only default values. We
consider inputs I1 and I2 such that I1|H = IH , I1|L = (~vdf)∗, and I2|L = IL,
I2|H = (~vdf)∗.
Since the program pi is deterministic and satisfies TSND, it follows that
I1|L = ID|L, I2|H = ID|H , (pi, I1) ⇓ O1, and (pi, I2) ⇓ O2. We next prove
that regardless of the order of execution, local executions are not stuck (i.e.
all input items necessary for their executions are provided by MAP).
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Regardless of the order of executing local executions, if the low execution
consumes the same low input items as in I, then the input consumed by
the low execution is (~vdf)
∗.IL.Ia, where Ia contains only low input items.
We next prove that Ia = .
Assume that Ia 6= . This means there exists an execution on input I ′,
where I ′|L = I|L.Ia. However, this leads to the conclusion that pi is not
deterministic. Contradiction.
Since pi is deterministic, it follows that the low execution terminates.
Using the same reasoning, we also prove that the executions of shadow and
high executions are not stuck, and these executions terminate. Therefore,
the lemma holds.
Proof of Theorem 4.6.1 for the enforcement mechanism of non-deducibility.
The proof follows directly from Lem. 4.6.2, Prop. 4.5.2, and the fact that
the controlled program satisfies TSND.
4.7 Summary
This chapter illustrated the proposed framework by presenting enforce-
ment mechanisms of three information flow policies: non-interference [20],
deletion of inputs [34], and non-deducibility [45]. The enforcement mech-
anism of non-interference is similar to the one proposed by Devriese and
Piessens, except that local executions are executed in parallel. Based on
the enforcement mechanism of non-interference, by few changes, the mod-
ified enforcement mechanisms can enforce non-deducibility and deletion of
inputs. From the formal semantics of controlled programs and enforce-
ment mechanisms specified in Chapter 3, this chapter demonstrated that
the constructed enforcement mechanisms are sound and precise.
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Testable Hypersafety Policies
This chapter presents the investigation on which policies can be
enforced by using the framework on input total reactive programs.
Reactive programs have to handles inputs in finite time and have
to process completely an input item before handling another one.
It shows that the framework can be used to construct enforcement
mechanisms for non-empty testable hypersafety policies.
5.1 Reactive programs
We consider deterministic and black box reactive programs. Assumptions
on reactive programs are:
1. input total: a program accepts all inputs defined over an enumerable
input item set;
2. computable: a program handles any input in finite time and generates
an output defined over an enumerable output item set;
3. an input item must be handled completely before another input item
can be processed.
Such reactive programs can be implemented in our language by using the
pattern in Figure 5.1, where T is the boolean value true, envin is the only
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1: while T do
2: input x from envin
3: //Calculate output o with a terminating and deterministic program.
4: output o to envout
5: end while
Figure 5.1: Implementation of a reactive program
input channel and envout is the only output channel. Hereafter, without
any further notice, by programs, we mean reactive programs following the
pattern in Figure 5.1. Since there is only one input channel, we use i to
denote an input item. Similarly, we use o to denote an output item.
Notation. As presented in Chapter 3, I and O are respectively the enu-
merable set of input items and the enumerable set of output items. Let I∗
be the set of all finite inputs. An input with length n ≥ 1 can be expressed
as [i1. . . . .in]. This notation is also used for outputs.
We write pi(I) = O, where I is a finite input, O is a finite output, I and
O are of equal length, to mean that from an initial state with input I (i.e.
{prg:pi,mem:m0, in:I, out:}, where m0 is the initial memory), pi consumes
completely I and generates output O. Formally, pi(I) = O means that
there is a sequence of transitions of pi from the initial state with input
I (i.e. {prg :pi,mem :m0, in :I, out :}, where m0 is the initial memory) to
{prg :pi,mem :m′, in :, out :O}, where m′ is a the memory of the program
after it finishes handling input I. Notice that for a program pi follows the
pattern in Figure 5.1, the program before consuming any input I and the
program after consuming I are the same.
A program pi is input total if for any I, there exists O such that pi(I) = O.
A program pi is deterministic if for any I, O and O′, if pi(I) = O and
pi(I) = O′ then O = O′.
A primitive observation is a pair (I, O), where I and O are respectively
a finite input and a finite output, and of equal length. A program pi has
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the primitive observation (I, O) iff pi(I) = O. An observation M is a finite
set of primitive observations. M is an observation of program pi (denoted
by M ⊆ pi) iff all the primitive observations in M is of pi.
An observation M is prefixed-closed if (I.i, O.o) in M then (I, O) is also
in M . The prefix closure of M (denoted by M) is the smallest set that
includes M and is prefixed-closed. M is possible if it can be exposed by a
deterministic reactive program, i.e if (I, O) and (I, O′) are in M , then O
and O′ are equal. Hereafter, we consider only possible observations. We
use OBS to denote the set of all observations.
We write input(M) for the set {I | (I, O) ∈ M}. Given a finite set of
inputs Is, map(pi, Is) returns the observation of pi on Is:
map(pi, Is) = {(I, O)|I ∈ Is ∧ pi(I) = O}
Example 5.1.1. Let I = O = {a, b}. The prefix closure of M1 = {([a.b], [a.b])}
is M 1 = {(, ), ([a], [a]), ([a.b], [a.b])}. Observation M2 = {([a.b], [a.b]), ([a], [b])}
is not a possible observation since there is no deterministic reactive program
pi such that pi([a]) = [a] and pi([a]) = [b].
5.2 Policies
A policy P can be defined as the set of programs allowed by the policy.
Membership of the policy is required to be compatible with observational
equivalence: if pi ∈ P then all programs observationally equivalent with
pi must also be in P . Hence, one can also think of a policy as a set of
sets of primitive observations: a program satisfies the policy iff the set of
primitive observations of the program is an element of the policy [17].
In [17], Clarkson and Schneider define hypersafety policies. Informally,
if a program is not in a hypersafety policy P , then this program has an
observation disallowed by the policy [17, 16].
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Definition 5.2.1 ([17, 16]). A policy P is a hypersafety policy iff
∀pi 6∈ P =⇒ ∃Mbad ∈ OBS.Mbad ⊆ pi ∧ (∀pi′.Mbad ⊆ pi′ =⇒ pi′ 6∈ P)
Hypersafety policies can be specified by defining a set M of bad or
disallowed observations. The corresponding policy P is then defined as:
pi 6∈ P if and only if pi has one of the specified bad observations Mbad ∈
M. However, for a given hypersafety policy, M need not be unique. For
example, one may choose M to be the set containing any one Mbad for
every pi 6∈ P .
Example 5.2.1. Non-interference (NI), the policy that low (L) outputs do
not depend on high (H) inputs is a hypersafety policy, and can be specified
by defining a set of disallowed observations as follows. Let lvl be a function
that assigns H or L to input and output values. Given an input I, let I|L
be the resulting input after filtering out the input values i with lvl(i) = H
(and similarly for O|L).
A reactive program pi is non-interferent (or pi ∈ PNI) iff
∀I, I ′ ∈ I∗ : I|L = I ′|L =⇒ O|L = O′|L,
where pi(I) = O and pi(I ′) = O′.
A set of bad observations that specifies PNI is:
{{(I, O), (I ′, O′)} | I|L = I ′|L ∧ O|L 6= O′|L}.
A program pi that has an observation in this set is not non-interferent.
If pi does not have any such observation, then it is non-interferent.
5.2.1 Testable hypersafety policies
A hypersafety policy can be specified by different sets of bad observations.
A canonical set of bad observations for a given policy is the maximal set.
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Definition 5.2.2. For a hypersafety policy P, we defineMP , the maximal
set of bad observations as:
MP = {Mbad | ∀pi : Mbad ⊆ pi =⇒ pi 6∈ P}
An observation M is allowed by a policy P iff M 6∈ MP .
It is maximal in the sense that any other setM that specifies the same
policy P is a subset of MP . For any hypersafety policy P , the maximal
set MP always exists.
Definition 5.2.3. A hypersafety policy P is testable iff membership in
MP is decidable.
For the construction of enforcement mechanisms, we limit our attention
to testable hypersafety policies. Such policies can be specified by giving
a total computable boolean function reject(M) that for an observation M
returns T iff M ∈MP .
It is non-trivial to check whether a set of bad observations specified
by a reject function is actually maximal. For example, the set of bad
observations that we specified in Example 5.2.1 for NI is not maximal. It
does not contain observations that have violated the policy in the past but
where things have ”re-adjusted” as the execution progressed, as shown in
the following example.
Example 5.2.2. Suppose that I = O = {0, 1} and that lvl(0) = L whereas
lvl(1) = H. Consider the following observation {([0.1.0], [0.1.0]), ([1.0.0], [0.0.1])}.
This observation is possible and it satisfies the simple test presented in Ex-
ample 5.2.1 because the outputs are equivalent [0.1.0]|L = [0.0] = [1.0.0]|L.
However, no program that satisfies the non-interference policy can gener-
ate this observation because it will have to first generate the observation
{[0.1, 0.1], ([1.0], [0.0])} which would violate the policy.
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Fortunately, the maximal set for non-interference is still decidable.
Example 5.2.3 (NI, a testable hypersafety policy). For the non-interference
policy discussed in Example 5.2.1, a reject predicate can be constructed as
follows:
reject(M) =

T ∃Mbad = {(I, O), (I ′, O′)},
Mbad ⊆M s.t. I|L = I ′|L and O|L 6= O′|L,
F otherwise.
It is straightforward to check that this is a total computable function. We
show that it specifies the maximal set of bad observations by contradiction.
Suppose that there is an observation M such that reject(M) = F and
M ∈MP . By construction of the reject() function we have that reject(M) =
F. Since MP is maximal, M ∈MP .
By definition of MP , all programs pi such that M ⊆ pi must not belong
to the policy. Consider now one of such programs pigood such that for all
(I, O) ∈ M , pigood(I) = O and otherwise it always outputs a value o with
lvl(o) = H. This program satisfies the policy. Contradiction.
5.2.2 Incrementally constructing observations allowed by a pol-
icy
An enforcement mechanism must not only decide whether or not an obser-
vation is rejected by the policy. It must also “correct” programs that turn
out to have observations that are not allowed (for instance by terminating
the program, or more generally by modifying the outputs of the program).
Given an observation M of the untrusted program that is still allowed so
far, when we find for the next input item i that the corresponding output
will lead to a violation of the policy, we need to find another output that
will not lead to a violation of the policy.
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Definition 5.2.4. Given a set of bad observations M that specifies a hy-
persafety policy, a function extendM(M, I, i) is an extension function for
M iff, for any observation M 6∈ M, where (I, O) ∈M , it returns an o ∈ O
such that M ∪ {(I.i, O.o)} 6∈ M.
One of the reasons why it is useful to work with the maximal set of bad
observations to specify a policy is that for the maximal set, an extension
function always exists.
Proposition 5.2.1. For any hypersafety policy P, there exists an extension
function for the maximal set of bad observations MP .
Proof. If the policy P is empty then all observations are bad observations
(in MP) and therefore the precondition for the applicability of the exten-
sion function is false, and we are done.
If the policy is not empty, consider an observation M that is allowed
by MP . By definition of maximal set of bad observations there must be
a program pigood such that M ⊆ pigood and pigood ∈ P (if none existed M
would have been in MP).
Let I be an arbitrary input such that (I, O) ∈ M and i an arbi-
trary input value. By definition of observation on a program, it must
be pigood(I) = O. Since programs are input total, pigood(I.i) has the form
O.o for some o ∈ O. Pick this o as the return value for extendMP(M, I, i).
Suppose now M ∪ {(I.i, O.o)} ∈ MP . Since M ∪ {(I.i, O.o)} ⊆ pigood
by definition of maximal set of bad observation it should be pigood 6∈ P .
Contradiction. Therefore the set M ∪ {(I.i, O.o)} is also allowed by MP .
For a given hypersafety policy P , we write extendP(M, I, i) as an ab-
breviation for some function extendMP(M, I, i) that is guaranteed to exist
by the proposition above.
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Interestingly, for testable hypersafety policies, there is always a total
computable extension function.
Proposition 5.2.2. Let P be a testable hypersafety policy, then there exists
a total computable extension function for MP .
Proof. Let M be an observation, I be an arbitrary input in input(M) and
i be an arbitrary input value. The total computable extension function is
constructed as follows:
1. if the first argument M already belongs to MP then the function
returns an arbitrary output value; (in this case the precondition for
the extension function is not satisfied, and we can return any value)
2. otherwise the function enumerates all output values o and submits
each observation M∪{(I.i, O.o)} to the total computable membership
test for MP continuing until the reject() function returns false.
Since (by Proposition 5.2.1) an ogood exists such that M ∪ {(I.i, O.ogood)}
is not in MP this procedure terminates.
The function constructed in the proof of Proposition 5.2.2 is not very ef-
ficient. Some policies admit much more efficient ways of extending allowed
observations.
Example 5.2.4. For the non-interference policy, we can define extendPNI(M, I, i)
as follows. Let oH be an arbitrary output value with lvl(oH) = H.
1. if (I.i, O.o) is in M , then return o,
2. else if lvl(i) = H, then return oH ,
3. else if lvl(i) = L:
(a) if there exists (I ′.i, O′.o′) in M s.t. I ′|L = I|L then return o′
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(b) otherwise, return oH .
We show that this is a correct extension function by contradiction.
Suppose there exists an input I, an input value i, and an output O
such that (I, O) ∈ M , reject(M) = F, and reject(M ∪ {(I.i, O.o)}) =
T, where the reject( )predicate is specified as in Example 5.2.3 and o =
extendPNI(M, I, i) is the result of the above algorithm.
By construction of the reject() function we also have reject(M ′) = reject(M ′)
for all M ′. Let M1 = M ∪ {(I.i, O.o)}, then by hypothesis and the proper-
ties of the reject() predicate we have that reject(M1) = T. Further, since
(I, O) ∈M we have that M1 = M ∪ {(I.i, O.o)}.
• If (I.i, O.o) is in M , then M1 = M . Thus, reject(M) = T. Contra-
diction.
• If lvl(i) = H, then o = oH , hence lvl(o) = H. Since reject(M1) = T,
there exists (Ib, Ob) in M s.t Ib|L = I.i|L and Ob|L 6= O.o|L. Because
lvl(i) = lvl(o) = H, it follows that I.i|L = I|L and O.o|L = O|L. But
then Ib|L = I|L and Ob|L 6= O|L. Thus, reject(M) = T. Contradiction.
• If lvl(i) = L and there exists (I ′.i, O′.o′) in M s.t. I ′|L = I|L, then o
is o′. Since reject(M1) = T, there exists (Ib, Ob) in M s.t Ib|L = I.i|L,
and Ob|L 6= O.o|L. But I ′.i|L = I.i|L and O′.o′|L = O.o|L, and since
both (Ib, Ob) and (I
′.i, O′.o′) are in M it follows that reject(M) = T.
Contradiction.
• If lvl(i) = L and there is no (I ′.i, O′.o′) in M s.t. I ′|L = I|L, then
o = oH . Since reject(M1) = T, there must exist Ib in input(M) s.t
Ib|L = I.i|L. Let I ′b be the prefix of Ib that removes all elements with
level H at the end of Ib. Then I
′
b is in input(M), and it must have the
form I ′′b .i and it must have I
′′
b |L = IL. Contradiction.
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5.3 General enforcement mechanism
An important question needs to be addressed for a general enforcement
mechanism is that which alternative executions the enforcement mecha-
nism should look at. Another one is how to correct executions consistently.
5.3.1 Generating sufficient test inputs
For hypersafety policies like non-interference, the enforcement mechanism
should not only look at the input/output (I, O) of the current execution.
For such policies, it should also make sure that other primitive observations
that the policy defines to be incompatible with the current execution do
not exist, and in general there will be infinitely many alternate inputs that
can possibly lead to incompatible observations.
Example 5.3.1. For the non-interference policy, for a given primitive ob-
servation (I, O), the set of all other primitive observations that are incom-
patible with (I, O) is:
{(I ′, O′) | I|L = I ′|L ∧O′|L 6= O|L}
This set contains an infinite number of inputs I ′, so the enforcement mech-
anism can not query the program pi with all of them in finite time.
Fortunately, it is not necessary to check the behavior of the program on
all inputs that might be potentially conflicting with the current input.
We introduce the notion of test generator, a function that computes a
finite and sufficient set of alternative inputs to check.
Definition 5.3.1. A test generator for a hypersafety policy P is a function
g : I∗ → finite 2I∗ s.t. for all pi and all Mbad ∈MP :
∀I ∈ input(Mbad),map(pi, g(I) ∪ {I}) 6∈ MP =⇒ Mbad 6⊆ pi
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In other words, if a program pi has a bad observation Mbad, then there
is at least one input I ∈ input(Mbad) for which g(I) is a sufficiently large
set of inputs such that testing the program pi on these inputs in addition
to the actual input I will detect a policy violation.
Lemma 5.3.1. If, for every I, map(pi, g(I) ∪ {I}) 6∈ MP , then pi ∈ P.
Proof. Suppose pi 6∈ P . By definition, there is a bad observation Mbad ∈
MP such that Mbad ⊆ pi.
From the property of generators in Definition 5.3.1, it follows that there
exists an I ∈ input(Mbad) such that map(pi, g(I) ∪ I) ∈ MP . But this
contradicts the condition of the lemma.
Example 5.3.2. For the non-interference policy from Example 5.2.1 (with
reject specified in Example 5.2.3), g(I) = {I|L} is a test generator.
Let Mbad ∈ MPNI . This means there must exist (I, O), (I ′, O′) ∈ Mbad
with I|L = I ′|L and O|L 6= O′|L.
Now, suppose Mbad ⊆ pi, i.e. pi(I) = O and pi(I ′) = O′. We show that pi
has a bad observation either on inputs I and I|L, or on inputs I ′ and I ′|L.
Consider the output O′′ of pi on I|L = I ′|L. Since O|L 6= O′|L, we must
have either that O′′ 6= O|L or O′′ 6= O′|L.
• If O′′ 6= O|L, then pi has a bad observation on inputs I and I|L.
• If O′′ 6= O′|L, then pi has a bad observation on inputs I ′ and I|L.
This implies that g is a generator.
We can further reduce the size of the generator. Let us define g′ as
follows:
g′(I) = if I|L = I then {} else {I|L}
Since for all I, g(I)∪ I = g′(I)∪ I ′, it follows easily from Definition 5.3.1
that g′ is a generator if g is a generator.
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5.3.2 Consistently correcting executions
A second challenge that needs to be addressed is how to correct executions.
While processing an input I, the enforcement mechanism will explore other
inputs in order to check that there are no bad observations. So the output
for input I will be computed in different circumstances: while the enforce-
ment mechanism is actually processing I, as well as while the mechanism’s
actual input is another input I ′ and the input I is only considered as a
potential candidate jointly with I ′ for membership in a bad set. The en-
forcement mechanism should compute the same output for I in any of these
circumstances.
Example 5.3.3. Assume that I = O = {0, 1}. I ⊕ I ′ is defined for I and
I ′ of equal length as a pair-wise xor of I and I ′, where (0⊕1) = (1⊕0) = 1
and (0 ⊕ 0) = (1 ⊕ 1) = 0. Similarly, we define O ⊕ O′. Let 1 (resp. 0)
denote an input or output consisting of only 1 values (resp. 0 values).
A program pi satisfies a policy Pxor iff
∀I, I ′ : I ⊕ I ′ = 1⇒ O ⊕O′ = 1
The reject function that decides MPxor is as follows:
reject(M) =

T ∃Mbad = {(I, O), (I ′, O′)},
Mbad ⊆M s.t. I ⊕ I ′ = 1 and O ⊕O′ 6= 1,
F otherwise.
We define g(I) , {I ′ | I ⊕ I ′ = 1}. Obviously, given an I, such I ′ is
unique. It is easy to show that it actually is a test generator.
Now consider a naive construction of an enforcement mechanism EMPxor
that on execution of a program pi on input I, checks the behavior of pi also
on g(I) = {I ′}. If the enforcement mechanism finds that pi(I)⊕ pi(I ′) 6= 1,
it corrects the output for pi(I) to make it compliant with the policy. For
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instance, let pi be the program that just outputs 0 for any input value (i.e.
pi(I) = 0 for any I). If EMPxor(pi) is executed on [0], the enforcement
mechanism would see that pi([0]) = [0] and that pi([1]) = [0], and it would
decide to correct the output for [0] to [1]. It is easy to see that EMPxor is
not a secure enforcement mechanism, because if EMPxor(pi) is executed on
[1], it would see that pi([1]) = [0] and that pi([0]) = [0], and it would decide
to correct the output for [1] to [1]. Essentially EMPxor(pi) will be a program
that always outputs 1 on every input, and it violates the policy Pxor as badly
as pi does.
This is an example of inconsistent corrections: on execution of EMPxor(pi)
on [0], we are considering the alternate execution [1], but we are not taking
into account that the alternate execution might as well be corrected if it
were ever executed.
Guaranteeing consistency of corrections is challenging. One idea is to
use recursive invocations of the enforcement mechanism while checking
alternative inputs.
Example 5.3.4. For the example above, if EMPxor(pi) is executed on [0], the
enforcement mechanism would see that pi([0]) = [0] and then it should not
check this against pi([1]), but against EMPxor(pi)([1]). Unfortunately, for the
given generator, this would lead to divergence, as EMPxor(pi)([1]) will again
recursively call EMPxor(pi)([0]).
We address the issue of divergence by means of the notion of well-
founded test generator: a generator is well-founded, if there exists a well-
founded partial order @ on the set of finite inputs, such that:
• I @ I.i
• ∀I ′ ∈ g(I), I ′ @ I
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Now, we can recursively call the enforcement mechanism on alternative
inputs generated by the generator, and this will make sure that corrections
are done consistently.
Example 5.3.5. Consider again the Pxor policy. We now propose the
following generator: g(I.0) , {} and g(I.1) , {I ′.0|I.1⊕ I ′.0 = 1} .
This is a well-founded generator. The partial order @ can be defined as
(the transitive closure of) I @ I.i and I.0 @ I.1.
Now consider again an enforcement mechanism EMPxor that on execution
of an untrusted program pi on input I, checks the behaviour of EMPxor(pi)
also on g(I). Now the enforcement mechanism will let any program pi do
its original output on 0s and it will correct the output on 1s so that the
policy is satisfied.
For instance, let pi again be the program that just outputs 0 for any input
value. If EMPxor(pi) is executed on [0], the enforcement mechanism would
output [0]. If EMPxor(pi) is executed on [1], our algorithm would see that
pi([1]) = [0] and that EMPxor(pi)([0]) = [0], and it would decide to correct
the output for [1] to [1]. Essentially EMPxor(pi) will now be a program that
echoes inputs on outputs, and hence it is a secure program. The recursive
calls to EMPxor(pi) always terminate thanks to the well-founded generator.
For every non-empty testable hypersafety policy, there is a well-founded
test generator.
Lemma 5.3.2. Every non-empty testable hypersafety policy has a well-
founded generator.
Proof. Construct an enumeration of I∗ (the set of finite inputs) that has
the property that I is enumerated before I.i for all i, I. The constructed
enumeration defines a total order on I∗. Say I @ I ′ if I is enumerated
before I ′. Define the generator g(I) = {I ′ | I ′ @ I}. It is easy to check
that this is a generator: for any Mbad, let I be the maximal element in the
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set inputs(Mbad). Then inputs(Mbad) ⊆ g(I)∪{I}. Since pi is deterministic
and inputs(Mbad) ⊆ g(I)∪{I}, if Mbad ⊆ pi then Mbad ⊆ map(pi, g(I)∪{I}),
and hence map(pi, g(I)∪ {I}) ∈MP (from the property of maximal set of
bad observations).
5.3.3 General enforcement mechanism
We denote the general enforcement mechanism of a non-empty testable
hypersafety policy P on a program pi by EM•P(pi). The enforcement mech-
anism is constructed with three computable functions that are reject, ex-
tension, and generator functions. Notice that for a testable hypersafety
policies, the existence of these three functions are guaranteed.
To simplify the presentation, following the notation used in [37], in this
section, we use 〈pi,m′〉 to denote a configuration of the controlled program,
where pi is the instruction to be executed and m′ is the memory. We abuse_ and write 〈pi,m′〉 i|o_ 〈pi,m′′〉 to denote that on 〈pi,m′〉, the program
consumes input i, generates output o and moves to 〈pi,m′′〉. Notice that the
instructions to be executed before consuming the input and after generating
the output are the same.
A state of the enforcement mechanism EM•P(pi) is a tuple 〈I, pi,m0,m′, O〉,
where m0 is the initial state of pi, and m
′ is the memory of the controlled
program after input I, and O is the output of the enforcement mechanism
on I (i.e. EM•P(pi)(I) = O). The initial state of the enforcement mechanism
is 〈, pi,m0,m0, 〉, where m0 is the initial memory of program pi.
The semantics of the enforcement mechanism is described in Figure 5.2.
The first rule says that, if the observation obtained by combining the re-
cursive application of EM•P to g(I.i) and the new observation that pi is
producing are allowed by the policy, then we just release the output of
pi. The second rule says that, if the obtained observation is not allowed,
we will correct the execution. We correct it by selecting a new output
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OK
〈pi,m′〉 i|o_ 〈pi,m′′〉 M = map(EM•P(pi), g(I.i)) reject(M ∪ {(I.i, O.o)}) = F
〈I, pi,m0,m′, O〉
i|o
V 〈I.i, pi,m0,m′′, O.o〉
NOK
M = map(EM•P(pi), g(I.i))
〈pi,m′〉 i|o_ 〈pi,m′′〉 reject(M ∪ {(I.i, O.o)}) = T o′ = extendP(M ∪ {(I, O)}, I, i)
〈I, pi,m0,m′, O〉
i|o′
V 〈I.i, pi,m0,m′′, O.o′〉
Figure 5.2: Semantics of the enforcement mechanism EM•P(pi)
using the consistent extension function extendP . It is worth noting that
rule NOK presented here is a subcase of rule NOK in [37]. In [37], in
rule NOK, the configuration of the controlled program after the transition
can be an arbitrary configuration which is computed deterministically from
state 〈pi,m′′〉 and input item i.
We next show that the rules OK and NOK are a proper definition for a
program.
Lemma 5.3.3. EM•P(pi) is total computable, and deterministic.
Proof. We first prove that for every state 〈I, pi,m0,m′, O〉 of the enforce-
ment mechanism, and for every input i,
1. there exists m′′, o such that 〈I, pi,m0,m′, O〉
i|o
V 〈I.i, pi,m0,m′′, O.o〉,
2. for any o, o′,m′′,m′′′, if 〈I, pi,m0,m′, O〉
i|o
V 〈I.i, pi,m0,m′′, O.o〉 and
〈I, pi,m0,m′, O〉
i|o′_ 〈I.i, pi,m0,m′′′, O.o′〉 then m′ = m′′ and o = o′.
We show both properties by total induction on the well-founded order
@ on I∗, the set of all finite inputs. So, suppose both properties (1) and
(2) hold for all states 〈I0, pi,m0,m′•, O0〉 and input i0 with I0.i0 @ I.i.
The first property holds because (a) pi is total computable (in any state,
it accepts any input value and handles it in finite time), (b) the reject
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and extension functions are total computable, and (c) the computation of
the map of EM•P(pi) only needs a finite number of transitions on states
〈I0, pi,m0,m′•, O0〉 and inputs i0 such that I0.i0 @ I.i (this follows from the
fact that g is well-founded and hence all I ′ ∈ g(I.i) @ I.i). Hence by the
induction hypothesis all these transitions are total computable.
The second properties holds because (a) pi is deterministic, (b) the com-
putation of the map of EM•P(pi) only needs transitions on states 〈I0, pi,m0,m′•, O0〉
and inputs i0 such that I0.i0 @ I.i. Hence by the induction hypothesis all
these transitions are deterministic. Now reject() deterministically returns
either true or false. For the false case, we are done. For the true case, since
the extension function is indeed a function and its parameters are deter-
ministically determined by the input state and input value, this function
deterministically returns an o′.
We have just shown that the two properties hold. These two properties
imply that EM•P(pi) is total computable and deterministic.
Soundness. The definition of soundness is similar to the one in Chapter 4.
Definition 5.3.2. The enforcement mechanism EMP of a policy P is sound
iff for all programs pi, EMP(pi) ∈ P.
Theorem 5.3.1 (Soundness). Let P be a testable and non-empty hyper-
safety policy. Then EM•P is sound.
Proof. Let us say that a program pi is I-level secure if it does not have any
bad observation Mbad with for all I
′ ∈ inputs(Mbad), I ′ v I.
We first show the following property: For all I ∈ I∗, EM•P(pi) is I-level
secure. We prove this by complete induction on the well-founder order @.
So suppose the property holds for all inputs I1 @ I. We prove it holds for
I.
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For the case where I is empty: Since the empty list is a minimal element
under the @ relation, we just have to show that the primitive observation
(, ) is not in MP . This follows from the fact that P is non-empty: there
is a program pi ∈ P , and every pi has the observation (, ).
For the case where I has the form I1.i, we show that map(EM
•
P(pi), g(I1.i)∪
{I1.i}) 6∈ MP .
• For the subcase where the last output on this input was derived by the
OK rule, this follows from the fact that reject(M ∪ {(I1.i, O.o)}) = F
for M = map(EM•P(pi), g(I1.i)).
• For the subcase where the last output on this input was derived by
the NOK rule, we can use the induction hypothesis. All the inputs
in g(I1.i) ∪ {I1} are @ I1.i. Hence, the first argument to the extend
function is an allowed observation. By the property of the extend
function, we then also get for this subcase that map(EM•P(pi), g(I1.i)∪
{I1.i}) 6∈ MP .
Now we can show that EM•P(pi) is I-level secure. Suppose there is an
Mbad with all elements of inputs(Mbad) v I. Then we can easily see that
for all I ′ ∈ inputs(Mbad) it holds that map(EM•P(pi), g(I) ∪ {I}) 6∈ MP .
(For I ′ @ I this follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that g
is well-founded, for I ′ = I we have just shown it.) But then the definition
of test generator tells us that Mbad 6∈ MP .
Finally, using this fact that EM•P(pi) is I-level secure for all I, we can
apply Lemma 5.3.1 and we get that EM•P(pi) ∈ P .
Precision. In Chapter 4, the definition of precision focuses on terminating
executions. For reactive programs which run forever, we modify the notion
of precision as below.
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Definition 5.3.3. An enforcement mechanism EMP is precise iff for any
program pi that satisfies P, for any input I, EMP(pi)(I) = pi(I).
Theorem 5.3.2 (Precision). Let P be a testable and non-empty hypersafety
policy. Then EM•P is precise.
Proof. We have to show that pi and EM•P(pi) have exactly the same primitive
observations when pi ∈ P . We show this by complete induction on the well-
founded partial order @ on I∗.
Assume that pi and EM•P(pi) have the same primitive observations (I
′, O′)
for all I ′ @ I.i. We have to show that EM•P(pi)(I.i) = pi(I.i).
From the induction hypothesis, it follows that the derivation of the last
step of EM•P(pi) processing input I.i was done by the OK rule: EM
•
P(pi)
is applied only on I ′ @ I.i, hence the induction hypothesis applies, and
EM•P(pi) has the same outputs as pi on g(I.i). Hence, map(EM
•
P(pi), g(I.i)∪
{(I.i, O.o)}) is actually an observation on pi, and since pi ∈ P it follows
that map(EM•P(pi), g(I.i))∪{(I.i, O.o)} 6∈ MP , and hence the call to reject
must return false. As a consequence, the primitive observation of EM•P(pi)
on I.i is the same as the primitive observation of pi on I.i.
Theorem 5.3.3. Every non-empty testable hypersafety policies can be en-
forced soundly and precisely.
Proof. For any non-empty testable hypersafety policy:
• the reject predicate is total computable by definition of testable.
• Proposition 5.2.2 gives us a total computable extension function.
• Lemma 5.3.2 gives us a well-founded generator.
Hence, we can construct an enforcement mechanism with semantics as in
Figure 5.2, and Theorems 5.3.1, and 5.3.2 tell us that this enforcement
mechanism is sound and precise.
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5.4 Programming the general enforcement mechanism
In this section, we use the framework to program the general enforcement
mechanism in Theorem 5.3.3. Notice that the general enforcement mecha-
nism is constructed based on the extension function constructed in Propo-
sition 5.2.2, and the well-founded generator g constructed in Lemma 5.3.2.
The generator is based on an enumeration of finite inputs such that I is
enumerated before I.i for any I and i. The enumeration defines a total
order between finite inputs. Let enum(j) return the j-th input, where
1 ≤ j, and position(I) return the position of I in the order defined by the
enumeration procedure. We have position(I) = j iff enum(j) = I.
The activation of MAP and REDUCE are described in Figure 5.3. The
programs of MAP and REDUCE are described respectively in Figure 5.4
and Figure 5.5. Here we assume that a map instruction can send an input
to a local execution instead of only an input item. This assumption can
be implemented by using a loop on input items of the input. Initially,
the enforcement mechanism has only one local execution pi[0] at a sleeping
state with its initial memory
MAP is activated when REDUCE terminates, and there is only one local
execution which is the local execution that does not receive any input
item. Notice that MAP stores the input that it has received so far. This
information is necessary for MAP to calculate all smaller inputs when it
handles a new input item.
Assume that EMP(pi)(I) = O and pi(I.i) = Opi.o. Now the enforcement
mechanism has to handle a new input item i. To know whether the output
o is good or not, like EM•P(pi), the enforcement mechanism needs to test
whether (I.i, O.opi) and observation of the mechanism on g(I.i) are good
or not; and the enforcement mechanism calculates good outputs for inputs
in the order from 1 to position(I.i).
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MACTTESTABLE
red.prg:skip top:TOP = 0
∆,map.prg:skip⇒ ∆,map.prg:piM
RACTTESTABLE
∀j, 0 ≤ j ≤ TOP,EX[j].in:I = 
∀j, 0 ≤ j ≤ TOP,EX[j].int:sig 6= ⊥
∆, red.prg:skip⇒ ∆, red.prg:piR
Figure 5.3: Activation of MAP and REDUCE
1: input i from envin
2: j := 1
3: while (j ≤ position(I.i)) do
4: clone(identical(0))
5: map(enum(j), identical(j))
6: wake(identical(j))
7: j := j + 1
8: end while
9: I := I.i
Figure 5.4: MAP for a non-empty testable hypersafety policy
MAP goes through all inputs with order from 1 to position(I.i). For each
input, MAP creates a clone of the controlled program (Figure 5.4-line 4)
and fetch this clone the input (Figure 5.4-line 5). After the iteration, MAP
updates the input that it has received so far (Figure 5.4-line 9). Since
MAP starts the iteration from 1, pi[0] does not receive any input item from
MAP. Thus, a clone of this local execution can be used by the enforcement
mechanism when it wants to know output of the controlled program on a
specific input.
REDUCE is activated when all local executions consumes all local inputs
and finish calculating outputs. It uses outputs, a function that maps integer
numbers to outputs, to manage the generated output of the enforcement
mechanism on an input. On activation, REDUCE calculates outputs of the
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1: outputs := λx.x 7→ 
2: j := 2
3: while (j ≤ TOP ) do
4: I ′.i′ := enum(j)
5: //Get the output of pi[j] on I ′.i′
6: retrieve O′pi.o
′ from j
7: //Get the output of the enforcement mechanism on I ′
8: O′ := outputs(position(I ′))
9: //Get outputs of the enforcement mechanism on inputs in g(I ′.i′) and output of pi
on i′.
10: M :=
⋃
1≤k<j{enum(k), outputs(k)} ∪ {(I ′.i′, O′.o′)}
11: //Test observation M
12: if reject(M) then
13: //If the observation is bad, the output returned by the extend function is used
14: outputs := outputs[j 7→ O′.extendP(M, I ′, i)]
15: else
16: //If the observation is good, output o′ is used
17: outputs := outputs[j 7→ O′.o′]
18: end if
19: j := j + 1
20: end while
21: O.o := outputs(TOP )
22: kill(λx.(x > 0) ∧ (x ≤ TOP ))
23: output o to envout
Figure 5.5: REDUCE for a non-empty testable hypersafety policy
enforcement mechanism on inputs smaller than or equal to enum(TOP ),
where enum(TOP ) is the input that the enforcement mechanism has re-
ceived. Notice that REDUCE does not need to handle the case of enum(1)
which is the empty input since EMP(pi)() = . Therefore, the loop to
calculate outputs (from Figure 5.5-line 3 to Figure 5.5-line 20) starts from
2.
At Figure 5.5-line 5, REDUCE gets input enum(j) which is not an empty
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input (since j > 1). At Figure 5.5-line 6, REDUCE collects output O′pi.o
′
of the controlled program on I ′.i′. At Figure 5.5-line 8, REDUCE collects
the output of the enforcement mechanism on I ′ by outputs(position(I ′)).
Notice that when I ′.i′ is handled, the output of the enforcement mechanism
on I ′ was calculated and can be retrieved by outputs(position(I ′)).
Next, at Figure 5.5-line 10, REDUCE constructs observation M that con-
tains (I ′.i′, O′.o′) and all primitive observations of the enforcement mecha-
nism on inputs smaller than I ′.i′. After that, REDUCE tests whether o′ is
a good output for the enforcement mechanism on i′ by using reject(M). If
o′ is a bad output (reject(M) returns true), the output item returned by
extendP(M, I, i) is used as a good output item for the enforcement mech-
anism on i′ (Figure 5.5-line 14). Otherwise, o′ is used (Figure 5.5-line 17).
In the last iteration of the loop, j is equal to TOP and enum(j) re-
turns I.i. Following the above description, the output of the enforcement
mechanism on I.i is calculated and stored in outputs(TOP ). Thus, after
the loop, REDUCE gets the output item for the enforcement mechanism on
i from outputs(TOP ) (Figure 5.5-line 21) and sends this output item to
the environment (Figure 5.5-line 23). Before sending the output, REDUCE
removes all local executions except pi[0] from the array of local executions
(Figure 5.5-line 22).
Lemma 5.4.1. For any non-empty testable hypersafety policy P, for any
program pi and any finite input I, EM•P(pi)(I) = EMP(pi)(I), where EM
•
P is
the enforcement mechanism in Theorem 5.3.3.
Proof. Base case: It is easy to check that EMP(pi)() = EM•P(pi)() =  (
is the minimal element in the order defined by g).
Assume that the lemma holds for all inputs smaller than I.i. We now
look at I.i.
For REDUCE, the loop from 2 to TOP − 1 calculates the output of the
enforcement mechanism on inputs smaller than I.i. From the assumption,
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we have that for all I ′ smaller than I.i, EMP(pi)(I ′) = EM•P(pi)(I
′). Thus,
map(EMP(pi), g(I.i)) = map(EM•P(pi), g(I.i)), where map(EMP(pi), g(I.i))
is calculated by REDUCE in the last iteration. From the construction of
EMP(pi) and EM•P , we have EMP(pi)(I.i) = EM
•
P(pi)(I.i).
Theorem 5.4.1. For any non-empty testable hypersafety policy P, the
constructed enforcement mechanism EMP is sound and precise.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows from the facts that on any pro-
gram and input our constructed mechanism and the mechanism EM•P in
Theorem 5.3.3 generate the same output (Lemma 5.4.1), and EM•P is sound
and precise (Theorem 5.3.3).
5.5 Instances of the general mechanism
Given a hypersafety policy P , the steps that need to be taken to enforce the
policy using our general enforcement mechanism presented in Section 5.4
are:
1. specify a total computable reject function that decides membership in
MP . Prove that the set of observations for which reject returns true
is indeed maximal in the sense of Definition 5.2.2.
2. specify a total computable test generator function as in Lemma 5.3.2.
3. specify a total computable extension function, and prove that it has
the property required of such a function as specified in definition 5.2.4.
For a testable hypersafety policy, the construction of such an extension
function can be found in Proposition 5.2.2.
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Non-interference with two levels. Let pr be a total idempotent function
from finite inputs to finite inputs. That is, for all I ∈ I∗, pr(I) = pr(pr(I)).
We think of pr as a projection that removes confidential information from
the input.
A program pi is non-interferent w.r.t. pr iff
∀I, I ′ ∈ I∗ : pr(I) = pr(I ′) =⇒ O|L = O′|L,
where pi(I) = O and pi(I ′) = O′.
The projection pr can be instantiated in many ways, and our enforce-
ment mechanism can handle all these instantiations.
• pr(I) = I|L,HD where I|L,HD is the resulting input after replacing the
high input values in I with default values: this is a variation of non-
interference where content of input events is secret but the occurrence
of the input event is not. Our general enforcement mechanism can be
reduced to standard secure multi-execution [20, 38].
• pr(I) = I|L: models standard non-interference as in Example 5.2.1.
Our general enforcement mechanism defines a reactive variant of se-
cure multi-execution as in [9, 51].
• pr can more generally project to values that depend on all previous
values in the input. This can model for instance non-interference with
stateful declassification policies [47]. Our general enforcement mech-
anism even improves on the mechanism in [47], as it does not require
declassify annotations for precision since in [47] a declassify operator
is just a directive indicating that a particular value is computed by
the release function.
Construction of the reject predicate for this policy is similar to Exam-
ple 5.2.3. As mentioned above, construction of test generator and extension
function is described in Lemma 5.3.2 and Proposition 5.2.2.
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reject(M) =

T ∃Mbad = {(I, O), (I ′, O′)},
Mbad ⊆M s.t. pr(I) = pr(I ′)and O|L 6= O′|L,
F otherwise.
(5.1)
Non-interference for multiple levels. It is relatively straigtforward to ex-
tend all the variants of non-interference above to multiple confidentiality
levels. We illustrate this for standard non-interference.
Let 〈L,≤〉 be a complete lattice of security levels with a top level (>)
and a bottom level (⊥), and let lvl be a function from I ∪ O to L. A
program pi is non-interferent with respect to lvl iff
∀I, I ′ ∈ I∗ : I|l = I ′|l =⇒ O|l = O′|l
where pi(I) = O and pi(I ′) = O′, and I|l filters out all i with lvl(i) 6≤ l (and
similarly for O|l).
Construction of the reject predicate for this policy is as below. Construc-
tion of test generator and extension function is described in Lemma 5.3.2
and Proposition 5.2.2.
reject(M) =

T ∃Mbad = {(I, O), (I ′, O′)},
Mbad ⊆M s.t. I|l = I ′|land O|l 6= O′|l, for some l
F otherwise.
(5.2)
5.6 Summary
This chapter presented the investigation on sufficient condition of policies
that can be enforced by using the proposed framework. Controlled pro-
grams are reactive programs which accepts any inputs, process inputs in
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finite time and have to finish processing an input item before handling
another one.
This chapter described the notion of testable hypersafety policies, pre-
sented a general enforcement mechanism of testable hypersafety policies,
and proved that the general enforcement mechanism is sound and precise.
It then used the proposed framework to program the general enforcement
mechanism.
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Chapter 6
Downward Closed w.r.t.
Termination Policies
Chapter 5 presented the investigation on which policies can be
enforced by using the framework on reactive programs. One im-
portant constraint on reactive programs is that reactive programs
must handle inputs in finite time. However, there are reactive
programs that might diverge when handling inputs. Thus, this
chapter investigates which policies can be enforced on such reac-
tive programs. Specifically, the investigation focuses on an en-
forcement mechanism similar to the one in Chapter 5.
6.1 Overview
We consider reactive programs written in the template described in Fig-
ure 6.1. Compared to reactive programs in Chapter 5, on handling an input
item, the calculation of output might not terminate. Thus, on input I.i, a
program might consume I, generate O, and then diverge when calculating
the output for i.
We use ↑, a special output value to model diverged output calculation.
In a primitive observation, output values after ↑ are only ↑. If there is no
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1: while T do
2: input x from envin
3: //Calculate output o with a deterministic program that might diverge.
4: output o to envout
5: end while
Figure 6.1: Implementation of a reactive program that might diverge on an input item.
1: input i from envin
2: j := 1
3: while (j ≤ position(I.i)) do
4: clone(identical(0))
5: map(enum(j), identical(j))
6: wake(identical(j))
7: j := j + 1
8: end while
9: I := I.i
Figure 6.2: MAP for a non-empty, downward closed w.r.t. termination policy
↑ in O, then (I, O) is a terminating primitive observation. Otherwise, it
is a diverging primitive observation. Hereafter, by O we mean an output
without ↑, and by o an output item that is different from ↑. We write
(I, O ↑n) to denote a diverging primitive observation in which ↑ is repeated
n times.
We investigate which policies can be enforced soundly and precisely
by the enforcement mechanism with MAP and REDUCE programs are de-
scribed respectively in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3. The MAP program here
is similar to the one in Chapter 5. We modify the program of REDUCE a bit
since now the extension function may return ↑. In this case, REDUCE goes
into a forever loop. The modified program of REDUCE is in Figure 6.3, and
the forever loop is at lines 16-18. Notice that the enforcement mechanism
in Chapter 5 is constructed based on a total order between inputs such
that for any input I and input item i, I is smaller than I.i.
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1: outputs := λx.x 7→ 
2: j := 2
3: while (j ≤ TOP ) do
4: I ′.i′ := enum(j)
5: //Get the output of pi[j] on I ′.i′
6: retrieve O′pi.o
′ from j
7: //Get the output of the enforcement mechanism on I ′
8: O′ := outputs(position(I ′))
9: //Get outputs of the enforcement mechanism on inputs in g(I ′.i′) and output of pi
on i′.
10: M :=
⋃
1≤k<j{enum(k), outputs(k)} ∪ {(I ′.i′, O′.o′)}
11: //Test observation M .
12: if reject(M) then
13: //If the observation is bad, the output returned by the extend function is used
14: o′′ := extendP(M, I ′, i)
15: if o′′ =↑ then
16: while T do
17: skip
18: end while
19: else
20: outputs := outputs[j 7→ O′.o′′]
21: end if
22: else
23: //If the observation is good, output o′ is used
24: outputs := outputs[j 7→ O′.o′]
25: end if
26: j := j + 1
27: end while
28: O.o := outputs(TOP )
29: kill(λx.(x > 0) ∧ (x ≤ TOP ))
30: output o to envout
Figure 6.3: REDUCE for a non-empty, downward closed w.r.t. termination policy
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6.2 Orderly terminating policies
For a policy to be enforced precisely by this enforcement mechanism, we
require that if the enforcement mechanism on I terminates, then the en-
forcement mechanism also terminates on inputs smaller than I. Thus, in
a good observation M , if (I, O) is a terminating primitive observation in
M , then for any I ′ that is smaller than I and is in a primitive observation
in M , then I ′ is also in a primitive terminating observation in M .
Let M ↓, {(I, O) ∈M} be the observation that contains all terminating
primitive observations in M .
Definition 6.2.1 (Orderly Terminating). A testable hypersafety policy P
is orderly terminating iff there exists a total, well-founded order @ such
that
• for all I and i, I @ I.i, and
• for all M 6∈ MP , all I ′ and I:
I ∈ input(M ↓) ∧ I ′ ∈ input(M) ∧ I ′ @ I =⇒ I ′ ∈ input(M ↓)
Example 6.2.1. An example of orderly terminating policies is the policy
that requires a good program terminates on any input. Hereafter, we refer
to this policy by TER. The maximal set of bad observations of the policy:
MP = {M |∃(I, On) ∈M}.
For this policy, we construct a total order between inputs such that I
smaller than I.i for any I and i. It is easy to check that this order satisfies
the first condition specified in Definition 6.2.1.
Assume that the order does not satisfy the last condition of orderly ter-
minating policy. Thus, there exist an observation M 6∈ MP , I and I ′ such
that:
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I ∈ input(M ↓) ∧ I ′ ∈ input(M) ∧ I ′ @ I ∧ I ′ 6∈ input(M ↓).
It follows that there exist an observation M 6∈ MP , I and I ′ such that:
I ∈ input(M ↓) ∧ I ′ ∈ input(M) ∧ I ′ @ I ∧ I ′ ∈ input(M ↑),
where M ↑ contains all diverting primitive observation in M .
In other words, there exists a good observation containing a diverging
primitive observation. From the specification of the maximal set of bad
observations, this observation is a bad one. Contradiction.
6.3 Allowably divergent policies
Is the constructed enforcement mechanism for TER sound? Unfortunately,
the answer is negative. When the controlled program diverges on an input,
the whole enforcement mechanism also diverges on inputs larger than or
equal to this input.
The enforcement mechanism is sound if the divergence of the enforce-
ment mechanism because of the divergence of a local execution is always
accepted by the enforced policy. In addition, from the construction of the
enforcement mechanism, when the enforcement mechanism diverges on an
input I ′, it also diverges on inputs larger than I ′. Those divergences also
have to be accepted by the enforced policy. Thus, for a policy to be en-
forced soundly, if a bad observation is bad because it contains a diverging
primitive observation (I ′, O′ ↑n), then this bad observation must contain a
primitive observation with input I, where I ′ is smaller than I. In other
words, a diverging primitive observation is not bad because of itself.
Definition 6.3.1 (Allowably Divergent). A testable hypersafety policy P
is allowably divergent iff there exists a total, well-founded order @ such that
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• for all I and i, I @ I.i, and
• for all Mbad ∈MP and all I ′ in input(M bad):
M bad \ {(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈ MP =⇒ ∃I : I ′ @ I ∧ I ∈ input(M bad)
Example 6.3.1 (TINI for reactive programs). Reactive programs run for-
ever. After finishing handling an input item, a controlled program can
consume another one. Thus, in the below definition, instead of requiring
(pi, I) ⇓ O as in Definition 4.2.1, we only require that pi(I) = O.
A reactive program pi satisfies termination-insensitive non-interference
iff
∀I, I ′ : I|L = I ′|L ∧ pi(I) = O ∧ pi(I ′) = O′ =⇒ O|L = O′|L
The maximal set of bad observations of TINI:
MP = {M |∃{(I ′, O′), (I, O)} ⊆M s.t. I|L = I ′|L ∧O|L 6= O′|L}
We construct a partial order @po such that I @po I.i for any I and i; and
I ′ @po I if I ′ = I|L and I ′ 6= I. We next prove that for all Mbad ∈MP and
all I ′ in input(M bad):
M bad \ {(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈ MP =⇒ ∃I : I ′ @po I ∧ I ∈ input(M bad).
Assume that the constructed partial order does not satisfy the property.
Thus, there must exist Mbad ∈MP and I ′ ∈ input(M bad) such that:
M bad \ {(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈ MP ∧
(∀I : I ′ @po I =⇒ I 6∈ input(M bad)).
However, from the specification of the maximal set of bad observations,
there is no such bad observation. Contradiction.
We next prove that the constructed partial order @po can be extended to
a total order @ that satisfies the conditions of allowably divergent policy.
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The first condition is trivial. Because @ is an extension of @po, for any I
and i if I @po I.i then I @ I.i. We now look at the second condition.
Let Q(@a) be a predicate on @a, where @a is an arbitrary order defined
on all finite inputs. If Q(@a), then for all Mbad ∈ MP and all I ′ in
input(M bad):
M bad \ {(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈ MP =⇒ ∃I : I ′ @a I ∧ I ∈ input(M bad).
We need to prove that if Q(@po), and @ is an extension of @po, then
Q(@). Assume that this statement does not hold. Thus, Q(@po), and
@ is an extension of @po, and ¬Q(@). Since ¬Q(@), there must exist
Mbad ∈MP and I ′ ∈ input(M bad) such that:
M bad \ {(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈ MP ∧
(∀I : I ′ @ I =⇒ I 6∈ input(M bad)).
We consider an arbitrary bad observation Mbad 6∈ MP and I ′ ∈ input(M bad)
such that M bad\{(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈ MP . Since Q(@po), there exists I such that
I ′ @po I and I ∈ input(Mbad). Because @ is an extension of @po, I ′ @po I
implies I ′ @ I. Thus, for an arbitrary Mbad and I ′, if M bad\{(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈
MP , then there exists an I such that I ′ @ I, and I ∈ input(M bad). Con-
tradiction with ¬Q(@).
6.4 Downward closed w.r.t. termination policies
A policy that is both allowably divergent and orderly terminating might
not be enforced soundly and precisely by our construction. We consider a
policy that has two different orders, one satisfies the condition of orderly
terminating policies and one satisfies the condition of allowably divergent
policies. However, there is no order for this policy that satisfies both
condition. This policy cannot be enforced soundly and precisely by our
constructed enforcement mechanism.
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We next define downward closed w.r.t. termination policies and prove
that a non-empty downward closed w.r.t. termination policy can be en-
forced soundly and precisely by our constructed enforcement mechanism.
Definition 6.4.1 (Downward Closed w.r.t. Termination). A testable hy-
persafety policy P is downward closed w.r.t. termination iff there exists a
total, well-founded order @ such that:
• for all I and i, I @ I.i, and
• for all M 6∈ MP , all I ′ and I:
I ∈ input(M ↓) ∧ I ′ ∈ input(M) ∧ I ′ @ I =⇒ I ′ ∈ input(M ↓)
• for all Mbad ∈MP and all I ′ in input(M bad):
M bad \ {(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈ MP =⇒ ∃I : I ′ @ I ∧ I ∈ input(M bad)
Hereafter, when we mention an order of a downward closed w.r.t. ter-
mination policy, we mean the order that satisfies all conditions in Defini-
tion 6.4.1.
Example 6.4.1. We consider a policy P defined on I = {a, b} and O is
an enumerable set. The policy requires that good programs might termi-
nates only on [a] or [b], and if good programs terminates on [b], they also
terminate on [a].
MP =
{
M | ∃{([a], [↑]), ([b], [o])} ⊆M for some o ∨
∃{(i.I, o.O)} ⊆M for some o and O, i and non-empty I}
We construct a total order between finite inputs such that  @ a @ b
and I @ I.i for any I.i. It is easy to check that this order satisfies the
first condition of downward closed w.r.t. termination policies. We next
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prove that this order satisfies the other conditions of downward closed w.r.t.
termination policies.
Assume that the constructed order does not satisfy the second condition.
Thus, there exist M 6∈ MP , I ′, I such that:
I ∈ input(M ↓) ∧ I ′ ∈ input(M) ∧ I ′ @ I ∧ I ′ 6∈ input(M ↓)
From the specification of the maximal set of bad observations, good pro-
grams might terminate only on [a] and [b]. In addition, if they terminates
on [b], they must terminate on [a]. Thus, there is no good observation M
such that I ∈ input(M ↓), I ′ ∈ input(M), I ′ @ I and I ′ 6∈ input(M ↓).
Contradiction.
Assume that the constructed order does not satisfy the third condition.
Thus, there exist Mbad ∈MP , I ′ ∈ input(M bad):
M bad \ {(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈ MP ∧
(∀I : I ′ @ I =⇒ I 6∈ input(M bad))
From the specification of the maximal set of bad observation, to satisfy the
condition M bad\{(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈ MP , Mbad must include {([a], [↑]), ([b], [o])}
for some o, and does not include {(i.I, o.O)} for some o and O, i and non-
empty I. By removing ([a], [↑]) from such a bad observation, we get a good
observation. However, there are inputs (e.g. [b]) larger than [a] in the bad
observation. Contradiction.
6.4.1 Enforcement mechanism
The MAP program of the enforcement mechanism of a non-empty down-
ward closed w.r.t. termination policy is the same as the one described in
Figure 5.4. The REDUCE program is described in Figure 6.3. The acti-
vation of MAP and REDUCE is the same as the one in the enforcement
mechanisms of testable hypersafety policies. Notice that our enforcement
mechanism is constructed with the generator based on an enumeration of
inputs such that I is enumerated before I.i for any I and i.
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Lemma 6.4.1. For any non-empty, downward closed w.r.t termination
policy P, for any pi, any finite input I, map(EMP(pi), g(I) ∪ {I}) is an
allowed observation.
Proof. We use the complete induction technique on order @ defined in the
set of all finite inputs.
For the base case, the lemma holds since EMP(pi)() =  and g() = {}
( is the minimal element in the order @).
Assume that the lemma holds for all inputs smaller than I.i. Let M • be
the observation that contains the observations of the enforcement mecha-
nism on all inputs smaller than I.i, and M = M • ∪ {(I.i,EMP(pi)(I.i))}.
Case 1: EMP(pi)(I.i) = O ↑n. This case happens when there is a local
execution diverges, or there is an input on which the fix is ↑. Assume
that M is a bad observation. From the induction hypothesis, M • = M \
{(I.i, O ↑n)} is a good observation. From the definition of the policy, there
must be an Ib in input(M), where I.i @ Ib. From the construction, I.i is
the maximal input in M . Contradiction.
Case 2: EMP(pi)(I.i) = O.o. From the property of the reject function
and extension function, M is an allowed observation.
Theorem 6.4.1. For any non-empty, downward closed w.r.t. termination
policy P, the constructed enforcement mechanism is sound.
Proof. Suppose that EMP(pi) does not satisfy P . Thus, there exists a bad
observation Mbad exposed by EMP(pi). From the definition of generators,
there exists an I in Mbad such that map(EMP(pi), g(I)∪{I}) ∈MP . From
Lemma 6.4.1, for any I, map(EMP(pi), g(I) ∪ {I}) 6∈ MP . Contradiction.
Theorem 6.4.2. For any non-empty, downward closed w.r.t termination
policy, the constructed enforcement mechanism is precise.
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Proof. For the base case, since pi() = EMP(pi)() = , the theorem holds
for this case.
Assume that the theorem holds for all inputs smaller than I.i. We
consider the following cases.
Case 1: pi(I) = O ↑n for some n. Since I is smaller than I.i, the assump-
tion applies. Thus, EMP(pi)(I) = O ↑n. From the computation model, we
have that pi(I.i) = O ↑n+1. From the construction of the mechanism,
EMP(pi)(I.i) = O ↑n+1. Thus, the theorem holds for this case.
Case 2: pi(I) = O. From the assumption, we also have EMP(pi)(I) = O.
a) pi(I.i) = O ↑. Since there is a local execution that does not terminate,
REDUCE is not activated and EMP(pi)(I.i) = O ↑.
b) pi(I.i) = O.o. From the property of the policy, for any input I ′ smaller
than I.i, pi(I ′) = O′. Thus, REDUCE is activated. Since there is no
violation, o is used as the output of the enforcement mechanism.
Thus, EMP(pi)(I.i) = O.o.
Remark 6.1. As mentioned above, TER is not enforceable by our con-
structed enforcement mechanism. We showed that TER is an orderly ter-
minating policy. We now give a formal proof that TER is not an allowably
divergent policy. Assume that TER is an allowably divergent policy. Let i
and i′ be two inputs. We consider a bad observation Mbad1 = {(i, o1), (i′, ↑)}
for some o1. It follows that M bad1\{i′, ↑} is a good observation. Thus, there
must exist an terminating primitive observation in M bad1 and the input of
this primitive observation is larger than i′. Hence, i′ @ i. We consider
another bad observation Mbad2 = {(i, ↑), (i′, o′2)} for some o′2. Using the
similar reasoning as above, i @ i′. Contradiction.
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Reactive TINI is an allowably divergent policy and it is not enforceable
by our general construction. We prove that reactive TINI is not an or-
derly terminating policy. Assume that it is an orderly terminating policy.
Thus, there exists a total, well founded order @ that satisfies the condition
specified in Definition 6.2.1.
Let I and I ′ be inputs such that I|L = I ′|L. We consider a good ob-
servation M1 = {(I, O1), (I ′, O′1 ↑n)} for some O1 and O′1. From the
specification of the order, I @ I ′. We look at another good observation
M2 = {(I, O2 ↑m), (I ′, O′2)} for some O2 and O′2. It follows that I ′ @ I.
Contradiction.
Remark 6.2. There are policies that can be enforced by other enforcement
mechanisms but cannot by our constructed one. In Example 6.4.2, we
present such a policy.
Example 6.4.2. Given a program pi∗ such that the number of inputs on
which pi∗ terminates is infinite and there is an input on which pi∗ diverges.
Policy EQUI is defined as a set of programs that have the same outputs as
pi∗ on all inputs (in other words, the set of programs that are equivalent to
pi∗):
EQUI = {pi|∀I : pi(I) = pi∗(I)}
The maximal set of bad observations of the policy:
MP = {M |∃(I, O) ∈M : pi∗(I) 6= O}
This policy cannot be enforced by our constructed enforcement mecha-
nism. The problem is that if pi∗(I.i) = O.o and pi(I.i) = O ↑, our en-
forcement mechanism on pi and I.i diverges. However, this policy can be
enforced soundly and precisely by a rewriting mechanism that maps any
program to pi∗.
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This policy does not satisfy the specification of allowably divergent policy
which requires that a diverging execution is not bad by itself. This policy is
also not a orderly terminating policy.
First we prove that the policy is not an allowably divergent policy. As-
sume that this policy is a allowably divergent policy. Thus, there exists an
order @ such that I @ I.i for any I and i; and for all Mbad ∈MP and all
I ′ in input(M bad):
M bad \ {(I ′, O′ ↑n)} 6∈ MP =⇒ ∃I : I ′ @ I ∧ I ∈ input(M bad)
We consider I•.i• such that pi∗(I•.i•) = O•.o• for some O• and o•
(the existence of such input is guaranteed since there are inputs on which
pi∗ terminates). A bad observation Mbad = {I•.i•, O• ↑}. By removing
(I•.i•, O• ↑) from M bad, we get a good observation. In this good observa-
tion, all inputs are prefixes of I•.i• and smaller than I•.i•. Thus, there is
no input that is larger than I•.i• in Mbad. Contradiction.
Now we prove that that the policy is not an orderly terminating policy.
We first recall the definition of orderly terminating policies: there exists a
well-founded, total order @ such that for any I and i, I @ I.i, and for all
M 6∈ MP , all I ′ and I:
I ∈ input(M ↓) ∧ I ′ ∈ input(M) ∧ I ′ @ I =⇒ I ′ ∈ input(M ↓)
Thus, for all M 6∈ MP , all I ′ and I:
¬(I ∈ input(M ↓)) ∨ ¬(I ′ ∈ input(M)) ∨ ¬(I ′ @ I) ∨ (I ′ ∈ input(M ↓))
It follows that:
(I ∈ input(M ↓)) ∧ (I ′ ∈ input(M)) ∧ ¬(I ′ ∈ input(M ↓)) =⇒ ¬(I ′ @ I)
From (I ′ ∈ input(M)) and ¬(I ′ ∈ input(M ↓)), it follows that I ′ ∈
input(M ↑), where M ↑ contains all diverging primitive observation in M .
Since the order is total, ¬(I ′ @ I) implies I @ I ′.
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Therefore, for all M 6∈ MP , all I ′ and I:
(I ∈ input(M ↓)) ∧ (I ′ ∈ input(M)) ∧ (I ′ ∈ input(M ↑)) =⇒ (I @ I ′)
Given an input I ′ on which pi∗ diverges. Since the number of inputs on
which pi∗ converges is infinite, it follows that there is an infinite number
of inputs that are smaller than I ′. Thus, the order is not well-founded.
Contradiction.
6.5 Summary
This chapter presented the investigation on which policies can be enforced
by an enforcement mechanism similar to the one in Chapter 5. Controlled
programs are reactive programs that are input total and have to finish han-
dling an input item before consuming another one. Different from reactive
programs in Chapter 5, reactive programs in this chapter might diverge
on handling inputs. This chapter proposed downward closed w.r.t. ter-
mination policies and proved that any non-empty downward closed w.r.t.
termination policy can be enforced by the constructed enforcement mech-
anism. As shown in Example 6.4.2, there are enforceable policies that
cannot be enforced by the constructed enforcement mechanism. Thus, ex-
panding the sufficient condition for policies to be enforced is an interesting
avenue for future work.
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Conclusion
This thesis proposed the MAP-REDUCE framework, a programmable frame-
work, which can be used to construct enforcement mechanisms of differ-
ent security policies. The framework is constructed based on the secure
multi-execution technique. An enforcement mechanism from this frame-
work can execute multiple instances of the controlled program, and handle
input/output events for these executions.
To construct an enforcement mechanisms of a security policy, users have
to write a MAP program and a REDUCE program to control executions of
instances of the controlled program, inputs consumed and outputs gener-
ated by the enforcement mechanism. The thesis illustrated the framework
by presenting enforcement mechanisms for selected information flow poli-
cies: non-interference, non-deducibility, and deletion of inputs.
The thesis also presented the investigation on which policies can be
enforced soundly and precisely by the framework on reactive programs
that accept any input and have to finish processing an input item before
handling another one. On reactive programs that always terminate on
handling inputs, it showed that any non-empty testable hypersafety policy
can be enforced. On reactive programs that might diverge on inputs, it
demonstrated that any non-empty downward closed w.r.t. termination
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policies can be enforced.
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